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As a result, domestic violence is no longer circum-
scribed to the private sphere and it is not difficult to
strike up a conversation on the issue. Nonetheless,
the levels of domestic violence remain surprisingly
high. Domestic violence affects all segments of the
population and all ethnicities in New Zealand, how-
ever, the prevalence rates within Ma¯ori communities
are even higher than the rates for the general popu-
lation.4
The prevalence of violence against women per-
sists despite New Zealand’s commitments under
international law to secure equality for women, act
with due diligence to prevent, investigate or punish
acts of domestic violence and provide for effective
remedies to the victims of domestic violence. New
Zealand has signed and ratified the U.N. Charter,5 the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,6 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,7 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights.8 While none of these treaties
expressly addresses domestic violence, they each
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex.9 New
Zealand has also signed and ratified the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women10 (“CEDAW”), which imposes more
specific obligations on states to ensure women’s
equality.
This Report represents the culmination of a year-
long project undertaken by the Leitner Center for
International Law and Justice at Fordham Law
School to study violence against women in New
Zealand in light of these international commitments.
Violence against women, and domestic violence in
particular, is a serious issue that has received a great
deal of attention internationally over the last few
decades. However, patterns of violence persist in
both developed and developing countries, undermin-
ing the status and rights of women, and damaging
the lives of women and children who are exposed to
these situations. We acknowledge that the Labour-
led coalition government in power from 1998-2008
in New Zealand made deliberate efforts to combat
this problem. We maintain, however, that more can—
and ought to—be done.
The Fordham delegation was led by Professors
Jeanmarie Fenrich, Paolo Galizzi, and Chi Mgbako,
and the 2007-08 Crowley Fellow in International
Human Rights, Jorge Contesse, and included eight
second-year law students, Justin Bernstein, Annie
Chen, Abisola Fatade, Michelle Magbalon, Mani
Mostofi, Sarah Stevenson, Anupama Sawkar and
Emily Wei, and the Leitner Center’s Program Assis-
tant, Elizabeth Mooers. Prior to the on-the-ground
study, the delegation participated in an intense pro-
gram of study throughout the academic year, includ-
ing a seminar on human rights in New Zealand led
by Mr. Contesse and Professors Jeanmarie Fenrich
and Tracy Higgins. While in New Zealand, the dele-
gation met with lawyers, judges, legislators, govern-
ment officials, academics, local leaders, and ordinary
Introduction
Over the last decade, New Zealand has made significant efforts to address an acute
social problem—violence against women. In New Zealand, it is estimated that one in
three women has been a victim of domestic violence.1 In an effort to combat the
problem, New Zealand has enacted legislation and regulations which aim to prevent
and eliminate domestic violence.2 It has also created visible public education cam-
paigns calling upon people to stop “family violence” as it is called in New Zealand.3
1 See Infra, note 153 and accompanying text
2 See, infra, Part I.2.A.
3 Although “domestic violence” or “family violence” may also include child abuse, this report considers only male partner violence against women
and, as used in this report, “domestic violence” and “family violence” refer only to male partner violence against women.
4 See, infra, Part III.
5 U.N. Charter. The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, and entered into force on October 24, 1945.
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/180, at 71 (1948).
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The Covenant was adopted on December 19, 1966, and
entered into force on March 23, 1976.
8 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The Covenant was adopted on December 19,
1966, and entered into force on January 3, 1976.
9 See infra Part I. 
10 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW]. The Convention was adopted on December 18, 1979, and entered into force on September 3, 1981.
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The prevalence of violence against women
persists despite New Zealand’s commitments
under international law to secure equality
for women, act with due diligence to prevent,
investigate or punish acts of domestic 
violence and provide for effective remedies 
to the victims of domestic violence. 
The Leitner Center teams traveled to several New Zealand cities and towns, 
including: Auckland, Ruakaka, Christchurch, Hamilton, Invercargill, Kaitaia, Nelson,
Whangarei, and Wellington.
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Cathy Robertson from the National Collective of
Women’s Refuges in Invercargill, and Ruth Herbert,
in Wellington, with whom we worked closely both in
developing the project and during our stay in New
Zealand. They facilitated our access to many of the
individuals with whom we met and shared their
knowledge, wisdom, and stories of strength with us.
We also appreciate their willingness to comment on
an earlier draft of this report. The findings included in
this Report, however, belong to the authors alone
and have not been endorsed by any individuals or
organizations in New Zealand.
Several other individuals graciously facilitated
our work in New Zealand. In particular, we are grate-
ful to Pita Sharples, MP; Virginia de Joux, Child, Fam-
ily and Community Policy, Ministry of Social Devel-
opment; Sheryl Hann, former Outreach Coordinator,
New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse;
Matthew Palmer, Deputy Solicitor-General (Public
Law) at the Crown Law Office, and Hayley Samuel,
from Doctors for Sexual Abuse Care. 
We would also like to thank the many women
and men, judges, lawyers, scholars, and non-govern-
mental organization representatives who took time
off to speak with us and share their stories and per-
spectives on domestic violence, gender discrimina-
tion, and human rights in New Zealand. We learned
from all of them beyond expectations.
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The Leitner Center benefited from the contributions and assistance of many individ-
uals and organizations in New Zealand and the United States. First, we would like to
thank Di Grennell and Ani Pitman from the Amokura Family Violence Prevention
Consortium in Whangarei; Holly Carrington from Preventing Violence in the Home
in Auckland; Professor Ruth Busch from Waikato Law School in Hamilton; Senior
Lecturer Janet Fanslow from the University of Auckland School of Population Health; 
women and men from Aotearoa/New Zealand. The
delegation conducted approximately 165 interviews
in all.11
This Report presents the findings of this research
effort. It consists of three parts. Part I sets out the
normative framework on domestic violence, both at
the international and national level, and explains the
relevant norms that govern the relationship between
Ma¯ori and the Crown. Part II begins with a back-
ground discussion regarding the level of domestic
violence in New Zealand. It then proceeds to detail
the problems with the domestic law and implement-
ing regulations addressing domestic violence—both
with the law as written and problems with the law
and regulations as implemented or enforced, the
“implementation gaps.” Part II presents the delega-
tion’s findings with respect to a range of problems
women face when they are victims (and/or survivors)
of domestic violence. Similarly, Part II documents the
problems activists and workers face when they
address these situations. Some of these problems
relate to the existing law or government policy
whereas others have to do with the way the law and
policy has been implemented—or not implemented.
Finally, Part III addresses domestic violence in Ma¯ori
communities. While many of the problems present-
ed in Part II also apply to Ma¯ori, this Part discusses
some issues that affect Ma¯ori in particular. Both
Parts II and III offer recommendations designed to
address the documented problems. During the
course of our research, the New Zealand govern-
ment has apparently decided to adopt a number of
modifications to the existing legislation and policies
addressing domestic violence. We commend the
government for its willingness to make necessary
modifications and join the government in hoping
that these changes will help reduce and ultimately
eliminate violence against women. 
11 See annex I.
12 U.N. Charter. The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, and entered into force on October 24, 1945.
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/180, at 71 (1948).
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The Covenant was adopted on December 19, 1966, and
entered into force on March 23, 1976.
15 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The Covenant was adopted on December 19,
1966, and entered into force on January 3, 1976.
16 U.N. Charter, art. 55 states: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: . . . (c) Universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 13, art. 7 states: 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. 
ICCPR, art. 26 states: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Id. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
ICESCR, art. 3 states: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cul-
tural rights set forth in the present Covenant. 
main regulations and programs put in place by the
New Zealand government to prevent and eradicate
domestic violence, paying attention to provisions
that aim at ensuring culturally pertinent approaches
in the case of ethnic minorities, especially Ma¯ori.
This section discusses the Domestic Violence Act
1995, the strategy on domestic violence prevention
(Te Rito), the establishment of the Taskforce for
Action on Violence Within Families, and the work of
the Family Violence Clearinghouse. This Part closes
with a description of New Zealand’s international
and domestic legal obligations towards indigenous
people. Because domestic violence disproportionate-
ly affects Ma¯ori, and New Zealand’s founding docu-
ment is a Treaty celebrated by the Crown and Ma¯ori,
it is important to lay out the normative framework
for the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. This
normative framework provides guidance for the rec-
ommendations made regarding additional measures
that should be taken to eradicate domestic violence.
I: New Zealand’s obligations under international law
and domestic law regarding domestic violence 
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1. Domestic Violence as an 
International Human Rights Violation
Domestic violence is a form of prohibited discrimi-
nation under international law and states are obligat-
ed to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate or
punish such acts and to provide effective remedies
to the victims of domestic violence. This section will
consider New Zealand’s obligations with respect to
domestic violence under international instruments.
International human rights law embodies a clear
commitment to equal rights for women. New
Zealand has signed and ratified the U.N. Charter,12
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,13 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,14
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights.15 Although these treaties do not
expressly address domestic violence, they each pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sex.16 New
Zealand has also signed and ratified CEDAW, which
This Part lays out the normative framework on domestic violence, both at the inter-
national and national level, and explains the relevant norms that govern the relation-
ship between Ma¯ori and the Crown. First, it sets forth the international rules and
standards whereby domestic violence is deemed a human rights violation. As a
signatory to CEDAW and other major international treaties, the provisions of inter-
national human rights law are binding on New Zealand. Second, this Part explains the
imposes more specific obligations on states to ensure
women’s equality. CEDAW defines “discrimination
against women” as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction
made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status,
on a basis of equality of men and women,
of human rights and fundamental free-
doms in the political, economic, social, cul-
tural, civil or any other field.17
CEDAW then requires states to “pursue by all appro-
priate means and without delay a policy of eliminat-
ing discrimination against women,” including by leg-
islation and other measures.18 It also requires that
states take measures to “modify the social and cul-
tural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary. . . practices which are based on the idea
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” 19
Although CEDAW does not specifically address
domestic violence, the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW
Committee”) has recognized that such gender-based
violence is “a form of discrimination that seriously
inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms
on a basis of equality with men.” 20 In its General
Recommendation 19, the CEDAW Committee inter-
preted CEDAW’s definition of discrimination against
women to: 
include[ ] gender-based violence, that is, vio-
lence that is directed against a woman because
she is a woman or that affects women dispro-
portionately. It includes acts that inflict physi-
cal, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats
of such acts, coercion and other deprivations
of liberty. Gender-based violence may breach
specific provisions of the Convention, regard-
less of whether those provisions expressly
mention violence.21
General Recommendation 19 further declares that
gender-based violence violates a number of rights
guaranteed by CEDAW, including the right to life; the
right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to
liberty and security of person; the right to equal pro-
tection under the law; the right to equality in the
family; the right to the highest standard attainable of
physical and mental health; and the right to just and
favourable conditions of work.22 The Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women, an
important policy instrument adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1993, similarly affirms
that “violence against women constitutes a violation
of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women
and impairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those
rights and freedoms.” 23
Although the perpetrators in instances of domes-
tic violence are typically non-state actors, such as
spouses or partners, under international human rights
law states may also be accountable for human rights
abuses by private actors if states fail to take positive
steps to promote and protect rights. With respect to
domestic violence, “[s]tates may also be responsible
8 IT’S NOT OK
17 CEDAW, art. 1.
18 CEDAW, art. 2.
19 CEDAW, art. 5.
20 U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 19, Violence against Women, ¶1 (1992) 
[hereinafter General Recommendation 19].
21 General Recommendation 19 at ¶6.
22 General Recommendation 19 at ¶7.
23 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/104 (1994), at 2. 
24 General Recommendation 19 at ¶9 (emphasis added). The U.N. Declaration similarly states that States should “exercise due diligence to prevent,
investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State
or by private persons.” Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/104 (1994), at art. 4(c).
25 In-depth study on all forms of violence against women, Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add.1 (2006), at para. 257.
26 AT v. Hungary, Communication No. 2/2003, 2005, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women at 9.3, 9.4.
27 Id. at 9.6(e).
28 Id. at 9.6(f).
29 Id. at 9.6(g).
30 Id. at 9.6(h).
31 Id. at 9.6(d).
32 See, e.g., Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/104 (1994), at art. 4(d)-(k) States
should:
(d) Develop penal, civil, labour and administrative sanctions in domestic legislation to punish and redress the wrongs caused to women who are
subjected to violence; women who are subjected to violence should be provided with access to the mechanisms of justice and, as provided for 
by national legislation, to just and effective remedies for the harm that they have suffered; States should also inform women of their rights 
in seeking redress through such mechanisms; 
for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to
prevent violations of rights or to investigate and pun-
ish acts of violence, and for providing compensa-
tion.”24 The standard of due diligence is one of reason-
ableness, it “requires a state to act with the existing
means at its disposal to address both individual acts
of violence against women and the structural causes
so as to prevent future violence.” 25
There is a growing body of case law on domes-
tic violence at the international and regional levels,
which provides some additional guidance regarding
what governments are obligated to do to comply
with the due diligence standard. In AT v. Hungary,
for example, the CEDAW Committee concluded that
Hungary failed to comply with its obligations under
CEDAW because it had not enacted specific legisla-
tion to combat domestic violence, and had failed to
provide for protection orders or a shelter to protect
victims of domestic violence.26 In its decision, the
CEDAW Committee also made general recommen-
dations regarding measures the state party should
take to comply with CEDAW. Among other things,
the state party was advised to: enact legislation pro-
hibiting domestic violence against women, which
should include protection and exclusion orders as
well as support services, including shelters;27 “inves-
tigate promptly, thoroughly, impartially and seriously
all allegations of domestic violence and bring the
offenders to justice in accordance with international
standards;”28 “provide victims of domestic violence
with safe and prompt access to justice, including free
legal aid where necessary,” in order to ensure effec-
tive remedies;29 provide offenders with rehabilitation
programs;30 and provide regular training on CEDAW
to judges, lawyers and law enforcement officials.31
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
against Women provides a similar series of measures
that governments should implement to prevent and
eliminate domestic violence.32
In sum, international law requires that New
Zealand act with due diligence to prevent, investigate
or punish acts of domestic violence and that it pro-
vides for effective remedies to the victims of domes-
tic violence.
2. New Zealand’s domestic statutory
law, regulations and programs
addressing domestic violence 
A. STATUTORY LAW AND IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS
A.1. The Domestic Violence Act 1995
New Zealand has sound legislation on domestic
violence. After a thorough review of the Domestic
Protection Act 1982, in 1995 Parliament enacted the
Domestic Violence Act, which came into force in
1996.33
The 1982 Act protected persons from violence
occurring within the family. Until its passage, domes-
tic violence was viewed as a private matter; the 1982
Act allowed police to become involved in domestic
disputes. The Act provided remedies for victims and
survivors of domestic violence in the form of non-
violence orders34 and non-molestation orders.35 Non-
violence orders protected applicants from acts of
violence by the respondent, whereas non-molesta-
tion orders essentially prohibited the respondent from
entering or remaining on any property where the
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(e) Consider the possibility of developing national plans of action to promote the protection of women against any form of violence, or to include
provisions for that purpose in plans already existing, taking into account, as appropriate, such cooperation as can be provided by non-govern-
mental organizations, particularly those concerned with the issue of violence against women;
(f) Develop, in a comprehensive way, preventive approaches and all those measures of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that
promote the protection of women against any form of violence, and ensure that the re-victimization of women does not occur because of laws
insensitive to gender considerations, enforcement practices or other interventions;
(g) Work to ensure, to the maximum extent feasible in the light of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of interna-
tional cooperation, that women subjected to violence and, where appropriate, their children have specialized assistance, such as rehabilitation,
assistance in child care and maintenance, treatment, counselling, and health and social services, facilities and programmes, as well as support
structures, and should take all other appropriate measures to promote their safety and physical and psychological rehabilitation;
(h) Include in government budgets adequate resources for their activities related to the elimination of violence against women;
(i) Take measures to ensure that law enforcement officers and public officials responsible for implementing policies to prevent, investigate and
punish violence against women receive training to sensitize them to the needs of women;
(j) Adopt all appropriate measures, especially in the field of education, to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women
and to eliminate prejudices, customary practices and all other practices based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes
and on stereotyped roles for men and women; 
(k) Promote research, collect data and compile statistics, especially concerning domestic violence, relating to the prevalence of different forms of
violence against women and encourage research on the causes, nature, seriousness and consequences of violence against women and on the
effectiveness of measures implemented to prevent and redress violence against women; those statistics and findings of the research will be
made public;
(l) Adopt measures directed towards the elimination of violence against women who are especially vulnerable to violence. . . .
33 Domestic Violence Act 1995, 1995 No. 86 (N.Z.) [hereinafter DVA 1995].
34 Domestic Protection Act 1982, § 4.
35 Id., § 13.
applicant (or their children) lived, worked, or was
present.36 Non-molestation orders also prohibited
“watching or besetting” these locations. However,
non-molestation orders were only granted to appli-
cants who had separated from the respondent and
where the Court saw it “necessary for the protection
of the applicant or any child of the applicant.” 37 These
orders could be granted without notice to the respon-
dent if the Court was satisfied that the delay might
entail a risk to the applicant.” 38
Scholars and domestic violence experts had
expressed concern that the 1982 Act left out several
forms of domestic relationships, was “poorly imple-
mented,” and that “non-violence and non-molestation
orders were often breached repeatedly.” 39 The gov-
ernment initiated a review of the legislation which
eventually led to the enactment of new legislation. 
On July 1, 1996, the Domestic Violence Act 1995
(“DVA 1995”) came into force. The Act (1) expanded
the definition of domestic violence to increase eligi-
bility; 40 (2) created one protection order with stan-
dard non-violence and non-contact provisions; 41 (3)
introduced stiffer penalties for breaches of protection
orders; 42 (4) mandated rehabilitative programs for
perpetrators,43 and (5) made available voluntary sup-
port programs for survivors.44 The Act also account-
ed for the protection of children,45 child custody,46
and property and residency needs.47
The DVA 1995’s definition of domestic violence
is highly inclusive, encompassing physical, sexual,
and psychological abuse. Section 3 of the Act states: 
(1) In the Act, domestic violence, in relation to
any person, means violence against that
person by any other person with whom
that person is, or has been, in a domestic
relationship.48
Furthermore, Section 3 clarifies that “a single act
may amount to abuse” as well as “a number of acts
that form part of a pattern of behavior. . . even though
some or all of those acts, when viewed in isolation,
may appear to be minor or trivial.” 49
By incorporating psychological abuse, which
includes intimidation, harassment, damage to prop-
erty and threats (section 3(2)), and elevating it to the
level of physical and sexual abuse, the DVA 1995
aims at providing uniform protection to victims for
most, if not all, forms of abuse.50 By also stressing that
both single acts and patterns of smaller acts consti-
tute abuse, the law makes clear that all degrees of
domestic violence trigger legal protection.51
The DVA 1995’s expansive approach is mir-
rored in the definition of “domestic relationship.” Sec-
tion 4 states:
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person is in
a domestic relationship with another per-
son if the person—
(a) Is a spouse or partner of the other per-
son; or
(b) Is a family member of the other per-
son; or
(c) Ordinarily shares a household with
the other person; or
(d) Has a close personal relationship with
the other person.52
The Act further defines a family member as anyone
related by “blood or through marriage, a civil union,
a de facto relationship, by adoption [or] any other
person who is a member of the person’s wha¯nau or
other culturally recognised family group.” 53 The Act
also sets out factors for determining a “close person-
al relationship,” stressing the “nature and intensity”
and “duration” of the relationship.54
As laid out in Section 5 of the Act, “the Object of
this Act is to reduce and prevent violence in domes-
tic relationships by “(a) Recognizing that domestic
violence in all its forms is unacceptable behavior;
and (b) Ensuring that, where domestic violence
occurs, there is effective legal protection for its vic-
tims.” 55 The Act aims to accomplish its object by
(a) Empowering the Courts to make certain
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36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 5.
39 Neville Robertson, Ruth Busch, Radha D’Souza, Fiona Lam Sheung, Reynu Anand, Roma Balzer, Ariana Simpson and Dulcie Paina, Living at the Cut-
ting Edge. Women’s Experiences of Protection Orders, Vol. 1, August 2007, at 6, available at http://research.waikato.ac.nz/CuttingEdge/.
40 DVA 1995, § 3.
41 Id. § 19.
42 Id. § 5 (2) e & § 50.
43 Id. § 32.
44 Id. § 29.
45 Id. § 9.
46 Id. § 15 & § 19 (2) e (ii).
47 Id. Part 3.
orders to protect victims of domestic vio-
lence;
(b) Ensuring that access to the Court is as
speedy, inexpensive, and simple as is con-
sistent with justice;
(c) Providing, for persons who are victims of
domestic violence, appropriate pro-
grammes;
(d)Requiring respondents and associated
respondents to attend programmes that
have the primary objective of stopping or
preventing domestic violence;
(e) Providing more effective sanctions and
enforcement in the event that a protection
order is breached.56
The primary remedy under the DVA 1995 is the pro-
tection order. Protection orders prohibit the respon-
dent from inflicting any type of violence onto the
applicant and from any non-consensual contact.57
Protection orders are significant in that they trigger
or make available all other remedies under the Act,
such as access to programs or tenancy orders. The
court’s power to make a protection order is set out in
Section 14 of the Act, which states: 
(1) The Court may make a protection order if
it is satisfied that— 
(a) The respondent is using, or has used,
domestic violence against the appli-
cant, or a child of the applicant’s family,
or both; and 
(b) The making of an order is necessary
for the protection of the applicant, or a
child of the applicant’s family, or both.58
Applications to obtain a protection order can be “on
notice” 59 or “without notice”60 to the respondent. On
notice protection orders are subject to a standard
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52 DVA 1995, § 4(1).
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56 Id. § 5(2).
57 Id. § 19, § 20(2).
58 Id. § 14(1).
59 Id. § 7.
60 Id. § 13.
Family violence training for service providers in Kaitaia, New Zealand. In order to appropriately address
domestic violence incidents and their consequences, public officials and frontline service providers need to 
be adequately trained. 
procedure before a Family Court, whereby the
respondent has the right to contest the applicant’s
request for the order and the judge decides whether
or not to grant it. One of the key features of the DVA
1995 is the significantly lowered threshold for with-
out notice orders.61 Without notice applications are to
be granted “if the Court is satisfied that the delay that
would be caused by proceeding on notice would or
might entail (a) a risk of harm; or (b) undue hard-
ship—to the applicant or a child of the applicant’s
family or both.” 62 Once a without notice application is
granted, a temporary protection order is put in place,
which becomes final by operation of law after three
months “unless discharged.”63 Once the temporary
protection order is issued, respondents are served,
and if they fail to successfully challenge the order or
fail to do so in a timely manner, a final protection
order is issued.64 Likewise, once a protection order
becomes final it is permanent, although it “may” be
discharged on the application of the applicant or
respondent should the Court see it “fit” to do so.65
The DVA 1995 increases the punitive sanctions
against perpetrators as well as the sanctions for
breaches of protection orders. In addition to the
injunctive and punitive approaches of the protection
orders, the DVA 1995 incorporates rehabilitative and
social work elements. These elements come in the
form of mandatory programs for respondents and
voluntary programs for applicants. Section 32(1) of the
Act dictates that “[o]n making a protection order, the
Court must direct the respondent to attend a specified
programme, unless the Court considers that there is
good reason for not making such a direction.” 66
The approval process, general content, goals and
structure of these programs are regulated by the
Domestic Violence (Programmes) Regulations of 1996
(“1996 Regulations”).67 Section 32(1) of the Regula-
tions states that programs for respondents “must
have the primary objective of stopping or preventing
domestic violence on the part of the respondent.” 68
Furthermore, these programs also “must have the
goal of changing the behavior of the respondent,” 69
by (1) “increasing understanding” about the “effects,”
“impact,” and social, “cultural and historic context” of
domestic violence; (2) increasing understanding
about the DVA 1995 and the legal consequences of
breaching protection orders; and (3)“developing skills
to deal with potential conflicts in non-abusive ways.”70
It is a breach of the protection order for a
respondent not to attend the program as directed by
the Family Court, unless the program provider
excuses them.71 On completion of the program by
the respondent, the program provider must provide
the court with a report on attendance and participa-
tion. If a respondent fails to attend, program providers
are required to notify the registrar, which will bring
the matter to the judge’s attention.72 The judge may
call the respondent before the court.73 If summoned,
the respondent is asked to explain his non-atten-
dance and may face criminal prosecution.74 The DVA
1995 also makes voluntary programs available to
protected persons (applicants). These programs are
made available to the applicant on the issuance of a
protective order. The 1996 Regulations set out guide-
lines for the programs including: content and presen-
tations, goals, and structure. Regulation 26 provides
that every program must: 
(a) “…be consistent with the object of the
[1995] Act [“to reduce and prevent vio-
lence in domestic relationships and to pro-
vide appropriate programmes for persons
who are victims of domestic violence”];
(b) be designed to be presented in a manner
that—
…
(ii) Respects the cultural values and beliefs
of the people attending the programme;
…
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64 Id. § 13. 
65 Id. § 47.
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67 The Domestic Violence (Programmes) Regulations of 1996, 1996 SR 1996/174 (N.Z.) [hereinafter, Regulations 1996].
68 Id. § 32(1).
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71 Ministry of Justice, A Review of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and Related Legislation: A Discussion Document 45 (Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2007/domestic-violence-act-review/discussion.pdf. 
72 DVA 1995 § 39. 
73 Id. § 42.
74 Ministry of Justice, A Review of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and Related Legislation: A Discussion Document 45 (Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2007/domestic-violence-act-review/discussion.pdf.
(g) …provide for the assessment and ongoing
review of the needs of people attending the
programme.75
Regulation 28 outlines the goals every program must
adopt, such as promoting the protection of protected
persons from domestic violence; empowering pro-
tected persons to deal with the effects of domestic
violence; increasing understanding about domestic
violence, and presenting information about the oper-
ation of protection orders.76
While the DVA 1995 does not have strong cul-
tural components relating to Ma¯ori, the 1996 Regu-
lations directly provide for and mandate culturally
tailored programs for Ma¯ori adult protected persons
(applicants with protection orders in place). Hence,
the Ministry of Justice and the Department of Courts
select and contract with non-governmental Ma¯ori
program providers based on parameters set out in
the 1996 Regulations. Pursuant to Regulation 27: 
Every programme that is designed for Ma¯ori
or that will be provided in circumstances
where the persons attending the programme
are primarily Ma¯ori, must take into account
Tikanga Ma¯ori, including (without limitation)
the following Ma¯ori values and concepts: 
(a) Mana wahine (the prestige attributed to
women): 
(b) Mana tane (the prestige attributed to men): 
(c) Tiaki tamariki (the importance of the safe-
guarding and rearing of children):
(d) Wha¯naungatanga (family relationships and
their importance):
(e) Taha wairua (the spiritual dimension of a
healthy person): 
(f) Taha hinengaro (the psychological dimen-
sion of a healthy person):
(g) Taha tinana (the physical dimension of a
healthy person).77
Some program providers adopt a Kaupapa Ma¯ori
approach, which “is about thinking critically, includ-
ing developing a critique of Pa¯keha¯ [i.e., New Zealan-
ders of European descent] constructions and defini-
tions of Ma¯ori and affirming the importance of Ma¯ori
self-definitions and self-valuations.” 78
A.2. Other relevant statutes
The DVA 1995 intersects with several other
pieces of New Zealand legislation including the Care
of Child Act 2004, the Family Proceedings Act 1980,
and the Immigration Act 1987. 79
The Care of Child Act 2004 (CCA2004),80 which
replaced the Guardianship Act 1968, promotes child
welfare particularly as it relates to protection from
abuse, parental guardianship and access. Both the
DVA 1995 and CCA 2004 prohibit or curtail a par-
ent’s access to a child in cases of family violence
(abuse of partner or child). Section 52 of CCA 2004
supplies a set of child custody orders to be consid-
ered during DVA 1995 proceedings.81 Furthermore,
the CCA 2004 makes a presumption against respon-
dents under the DVA 1995 when approving addition-
al guardians (secondary guardians appointed by the
primary guardians).82
The Family Proceedings Act 198083 encourages
couples counseling before an application for a sepa-
ration order is made to the Court.84 However, when
an application is made, a judge may rule against
counseling when the respondent has used violence
(within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the DVA 1995)
against his partner or child.85
The Immigration Act of 198786 sets out the stan-
dards, framework and process for determining who
may enter and remain in New Zealand on a tempo-
rary or permanent basis.87 The specific policies under
the Immigration Act of 1987 are set out in the Immi-
gration Operations Manual.88 One such policy is the
Department of Labor’s Victims of Domestic Violence
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88 Id.
(VDV) policy that:
enables people temporarily in New Zealand
who have been living together in an estab-
lished relationship with a New Zealand citizen
or resident, and who had intended to seek res-
idence in New Zealand on the basis of that
marriage or relationship, to apply for a work or
residence permit:
• If that marriage or relationship has ended due
to domestic violence by the New Zealand
citizen or resident, and
• If they returned to their home country, they
would be disowned by their family and com-
munity as a result of their relationship ending,
and have no means of independent support.89
VDV applies to both women and men and uti-
lizes the broad definition of domestic violence found
in Section 3 of the DVA 1995.90 In April 2007, the
VDV was strengthened to include a protection order
under DVA 1995 “as evidence of domestic violence
for the purposes of the policy.” 91
B. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STRATEGIES AND
PROGRAMS OF ACTION
Along with the DVA 1995 and the above-mentioned
relevant statutes, the New Zealand Government has
published three strategy documents pertaining to
domestic violence in recent years. Each of these
strategies contains a range of new programs and ini-
tiatives to better address domestic violence. This sec-
tion explains the main characters of three relevant
strategies: Te Rito, the Family Violence Taskforce,
and the Family Violence Clearinghouse.
B.1. Te Rito
In 2002, the New Zealand government launched
Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention
Strategy, defined as “an integrated, multi-faceted,
whole-of-government and community approach to
preventing the occurrence and reoccurrence of vio-
lence in families/wha¯nau.” 92 Te Rito’s development
and implementation is guided by a set of nine prin-
ciples.93 The strategy comprises five key goals and
objectives (objectives are intended to help focus
goals) to be implemented within a five-year time-
frame. Lastly, Te Rito has 18 areas of action. These
actions direct the strategy’s implementation and stress
improving “inter-agency co-ordination, collaboration
and communication.” 94 Many of the principles, goals
and objectives, and areas of action emphasize a
need for culturally and ethnically relevant approach-
es with specific reference to Ma¯ori and Pacific
Islanders.
Te Rito roots the strategy’s intention to operate
in culturally relevant social spheres in the Treaty of
Waitangi noting that “[t]he Treaty of Waitangi pro-
vides for a unique relationship between Ma¯ori and
the Crown.” 95 This unique relationship recognizes
the Ma¯ori as “tangata whenua” [people of the land]
and as such Te Rito stresses, “it is important that
approaches to family violence prevention are con-
structed and implemented with the special interests
and needs of wha¯nau, hapu and iwi in mind, and
strengthen [their] ability to control their own devel-
opment and achieve their own aspirations.” 96 Fur-
thermore, Te Rito emphasizes that approaches to
family violence should be “culturally relevant and
effective for (a) wha¯nau, hapu, iwi; and (b) Pacific
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available at http://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/publications/sector-policy/te-rito.pdf. 
93 Te Rito’s guiding principles are: 
All people have a fundamental right to be safe and to live free from violence
The unique customary and contemporary structures and practices of wha¯nau, hapu and iwi must be recognised, provided for and fully
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Family violence prevention is to be viewed and approached in a broad and holistic manner 
Perpetrators of violence in families/wha¯nau must be held accountable for their violent behaviour 
There must be a strong emphasis on prevention and early intervention with a specific focus on the needs of children and young people 
Approaches to family violence prevention must be integrated, co-ordinated and collaborative 
The community has a right and responsibility to be involved in preventing violence in families/wha¯nau 
The diverse needs of specific populations must be recognised and provided for when developing and implementing family violence prevention
initiatives 
Family violence prevention initiatives should be continually enhanced as information and better ways of working are identified. Id. at 12-13.
94 Id. at 5.
95 Id. at 12. On the special relationship the Treaty of Waitangi sets between Ma¯ori and the Crown, see infra Part I.3.B.
96 Ministry of Social Development, Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy 6 (2002), at 12,
available at http://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/publications/sector-policy/te-rito.pdf.  
97 Id. at 14.
98 For instance, area of action 5 demands the development of a “plan of action for preventing violence in Ma¯ori communities.” Thus, Te Puni
Kokiri (Ministry of Ma¯ori Development) and its Ma¯ori Task Force on Family/Wha¯nau Violence is tasked with area of action 5’s implementation. 
peoples and other ethnic populations.” 97
Since Te Rito’s launch in 2002, the Ministry of
Social Development, through its Te Rito Small Exec-
utive Group, has periodically reviewed the progress
of all areas of action. Implementing Te Rito as an
umbrella national strategy often equates to macro
forms of implementation such as making funding
allocations to other programs, or drafting policies for
other departments.98 The New Zealand government
has not made available any Te Rito Progress reports
after 2004.
B.2. Taskforce for Action on 
Violence Within Families
In 2005, the Ministry of Social Development
established the Taskforce for Action on Violence
Within Families (hereinafter, “the Taskforce”) “to
advise the Family Violence Ministerial Team on how
to make improvements to the way family violence is
addressed, and how to eliminate family violence in
New Zealand.” 99 The Taskforce is a joint initiative
that brings together governmental and non-govern-
mental agencies, independent Crown entities and
the Judiciary “to work together and provide leader-
ship to end family violence and promote stable,
healthy families.” 100
The Taskforce develops specific programs for
Ma¯ori and Pacific peoples, as well as initiatives to
address child abuse. It also launched the Campaign
for Action on Family Violence—“It’s not OK!”—featur-
ing “community leaders, engaging community part-
ners and underpinned by awareness-training pack-
ages for media.” 101 The Taskforce has also overseen
police training in family violence investigation and
risk assessment. Drawing from the experience of the
Manukau (South Auckland) and Waitakere (West
Auckland) Courts, it advised the government to
establish four more Family Courts in Auckland and
Wellington, and plans on establishing still more
courts in the rest of the country. Starting in 2008, the
Taskforce “will focus on the quality and diversity of
approaches to eliminating violence in Ma¯ori and
Pacific families, with a workforce trained in preven-
tion, early intervention, protection and accountabili-
ty.” 102 The brochure, however, does not specify how
the Taskforce will carry out this work.
Most Taskforce members are chief executives.
The government has stressed the importance of
having high-level officials so as to “swiftly imple-
ment” improvements and policies across govern-
ment agencies.103
B.3. Family Violence Clearinghouse
Initially based at the University of Canterbury’s
Te Awatea Violence Research Centre, the Family
Violence Clearinghouse “is the national centre for
collating and disseminating information about domes-
tic and family violence in Aotearoa New Zealand.” 104
In September 2008, the Ministry of Social Develop-
ment, which provided the funding for the launch of
the Family Violence Clearinghouse, in 2005, took
over the administration of the website. The Family
Violence Clearinghouse’s purpose is to centralize
the information on domestic violence to be consult-
ed by both non-governmental organizations as well
as state agencies. Despite the large number of
resources contained in the website, it is not clear
whether it was created to share information with
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99 Information from the Ministry of Social Development’s website, available at http://www.msd.govt.nz/work-areas/families-whanau/action-
family-violence/taskforce-info.html. 
100 Id. Members of the Taskforce include the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development (Chair), the Chief Executive of the 
Accident Compensation Corporation, the Secretary for Education, the Director-General of Health, the Secretary for Justice, the Chief 
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Women’s Refuges, the Chief Executive of Relationship Services, and the Chief Executive of the Tamaki Community Development Trust.
101 Ministry of Social Development, The Ongoing Programme of Action. Summary (December 2007), available at http://www.msd.govt.nz/docu-
ments/about-msd-and-our-work/work-programmes/initiatives/action-family-violence/taskforce-ongoing-programme-of-action-summary.pdf. 
102 Id.
103 Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, The First Report 13 (July 2006), available at http://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/work-
areas/sector-policy/te-rito/taskforce-report-action-on-violence.pdf. 
104 See Family Violence Clearinghouse’s website, available at http://www.nzfvc.org.nz/. Te Awatea Violence Research Centre was established
“to foster research [on family violence], disseminate it, and make it available.” Interview with Annabel Taylor, Deputy Director, Te Awatea,
Christchurch (May 12, 2008). 
NGOs or with the government or to monitor and
follow-up the situation and studies on domestic
violence in New Zealand.105
The website hosts studies and evaluations on
the different regulations and programs on family
violence explained above. As such, the Clearing-
house allows researchers and policy-makers to
access up-to-date information as well as to make
informed decisions.
3. New Zealand’s obligations to 
Ma¯ori as indigenous people
This section analyzes the obligations under both
international and domestic law that New Zealand
has toward the indigenous Maori people. The section
provides the normative framework against which
domestic violence programs that affect Ma¯ori ought
to be designed, implemented and evaluated.
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW
As noted above, New Zealand is a party to most major
international human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,106
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights,107 the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,108 CEDAW,109
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,110
the Convention on the Rights of the Child,111 the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court,112 and the
Geneva Conventions I-IV.113 New Zealand is usually
regarded as a nation committed to the promotion of
the international human rights regime.114
Despite its adherence to most major treaties,
New Zealand has not ratified the two most important
international instruments addressing the rights of
indigenous peoples, namely, the International Labour
Organization Convention on Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169)115
and the Universal Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, adopted in September 2007.116
The former, adopted in 1989, is a fully binding instru-
ment, whereas the recently adopted Declaration con-
tains, according to the UN, “non-binding,” aspira-
tional provisions.117
Both the Convention and the Declaration lay out
a normative framework that seeks to promote and
protect the rights of native peoples. ILO Convention
169 provides for self-management and the right of
indigenous and tribal peoples to decide their own
priorities; 118 the right of indigenous peoples to be
consulted whenever any measure that may have a
direct effect on them is being explored, planned or
implemented, and the right to “be fully involved in all
relevant processes.” 119
For many years, ILO Convention 169 set the
highest standard for the protection of indigenous
peoples’ rights. With the adoption by the United
Nations’ General Assembly of the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in September 2007,
international human rights law has set up new and
stronger standards in areas including land and
resources, self-determination, participation, and social
and economic rights. Notwithstanding the Declara-
tion’s non-binding character, it raises indigenous
peoples’ right from consultation to “prior and informed
consent,” and “emphasizes the rights of indigenous
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108 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. The Convention was adopted on 
December 21, 1965, and entered into force on January 4, 1969.
109 CEDAW, supra note 6. 
110 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The Convention was 
adopted on December 10, 1984, and entered into force on June 26, 1987.
111 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. The Convention was adopted on November 20, 1989, and came into force on September 2, 1990.
112 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. The Rome Statute was adopted on July 17, 1998, and came into force on July 1, 2002.
113 The Four Geneva Conventions were adopted on August 12, 1949. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force on October 21, 1950; Geneva Convention for the 
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114 In May 2008, New Zealand became the tenth recipient of the United Nations’ Franklin Delano Roosevelt International Disability Award, recognizing
the country’s role as “a leading proponent of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” and its “deep commitment to
disability issues domestically.” See United Nations, Secretary General, Press Release, SG/SM/11551, May 6, 2008, available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11551.doc.htm. 
115 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989) (ILO Convention No. 169) 328 U.N.T.S. 247. The Convention
was adopted on June 27, 1989, and entered into force on September 5, 1991.
116 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on September 13, 2007. While
the Universal Declaration was adopted with the vote of 143 nations, only 19 countries—mostly from Latin America—have ratified ILO Convention 169.
peoples to maintain and strengthen their own insti-
tutions, cultures and traditions and to pursue their
development in keeping with their own needs and
aspirations.” 120
With “deep regret,” 121 New Zealand voted against
the Declaration. The government alluded to difficul-
ties with four provisions that were found to be
incompatible with New Zealand’s constitutional and
legal system, the Treaty of Waitangi and the principle
of governing for the good of all its citizens.122 Despite
these contradictions, the New Zealand government
emphasized that it “fully supported the principles
and aspirations of the Declaration . . . [and that] the
country had been implementing most of the stan-
dards in the Declaration for many years.” 123 To the
extent that New Zealand made no objection against
the Declaration’s provisions on self-determination,
consultation, consent, and participation it is possible
to conclude that the government agrees with the
Declaration’s provisions on these matters. Moreover,
UN treaty-based bodies have explicitly referred to
the duty of states to seek consent, grounded, inter
alia, on the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), to
which New Zealand is a signatory.124
As a party to the main international human
rights instruments, New Zealand submits periodic
reports on its adherence to the treaties and thus sub-
jects its human rights record to scrutiny by the
treaty-based bodies. While observations by the
treaty-bodies have generally been positive, some
treaty-based bodies have been critical of New
Zealand’s human rights record in certain areas. In
particular, in 2007, the CERD Committee issued con-
cluding observations noting concern over the real-
ization of rights by the Ma¯ori population. Commen-
dation was offered for the decrease in socio-eco-
nomic disparity between Ma¯ori (and Pacific
Islanders) compared with European New Zealan-
ders,125 but the Committee expressed concern over
other aspects of the law affecting Ma¯ori dispropor-
tionately, including the non-incorporation of the
Treaty of Waitangi,126 the 2008 cut-off of the Waitan-
gi Tribunal’s jurisdiction for historical claims,127 the
over-representation of Ma¯ori in the prison popula-
tion, and the Foreshore and Seabed Act.128 New
Zealand is expected to respond to these concerns
and, as a country that takes international law seri-
ously, it is expected that measures will be imple-
mented to address and show results in these areas.
Through different means, international law has
proved crucial for the advancement and protection
of indigenous peoples’ rights.129 Today, with the adop-
tion of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, the agreement among the community
of nations is unequivocal: states must take positive
measures in a wide range of areas to ensure that the
rights and interests of their native populations are
guaranteed. In spite of voting against the Declaration,
New Zealand is still obliged to observe the commu-
nity of nations’ norms and understandings on the
rights of native peoples. But this obligation does not
only derive from New Zealand’s international obliga-
tions; at the domestic level, perhaps unlike most
other countries with significant indigenous popula-
tions, New Zealand is bound by political and legal
obligations, in particular, those set in Tiriti o Waitangi
or the Treaty of Waitangi.
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128 Id. at ¶ 19.
129 As Wiessner observes, “virtually all indigenous peoples share a common set of problems resulting from the tortured relationship between 
the conqueror and the conquered. . . Five basic claims of indigenous peoples arise from this condition: (1) traditional lands should be respected 
or restored; (2) indigenous peoples should have the right to practice their traditions and celebrate their culture and spirituality with all its 
implications; (3) they should have access to welfare, health, educational and social services; (4) conquering nations should respect and honor 
their treaty promises; and (5) indigenous nations should have the right to self-determination. Sigfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous
Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 98-99 (1999).
B. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI
In 1840, over 200 Ma¯ori chiefs and the representa-
tives of the Queen of England signed a treaty that
would set the framework for the relationship between
the settlers and the native Ma¯ori population. The
Treaty, signed in Waitangi, is “widely held to be New
Zealand’s founding document,” 130 and is considered
applicable to all Ma¯ori as official policy.131 In the words
of the Waitangi Tribunal, 
[t]heTreaty represents the gift [by Ma¯ori ] of the
right to make laws in return for the promise to
do so so as to acknowledge and protect the
interest of the indigenous inhabitants. . . That
then was the exchange of gifts that the Treaty
represented. The gift of the right to make laws,
and the promise to do so so as to accord the
Ma¯ori interest an appropriate priority.132
Despite the Treaty of Waitangi’s brevity—it only
contains three articles—there is wide disagreement
on its interpretation, particularly, on the extent of
sovereignty that Ma¯ori ceded to the Crown. The
debate is grounded on the different English and
Ma¯ori versions of the Treaty: in the English version,
Ma¯ori chiefs cede “sovereignty,” whereas in the
Ma¯ori version the term used is “kawanatanga,”which
is translated as “governorship.” 133 It is argued that
Ma¯ori could not cede “sovereignty” because no such
notion existed in their language. Similarly, Article II of
the Treaty’s English version guarantees to Ma¯ori the
“full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their
Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other prop-
erties which they may collectively or individually
possess,” whereas in the Ma¯ori version the chiefs
retain “te tino rangatiratanga”—which is translated as
‘full chieftainship’—of “taonga,” that is, ‘treasures,
properties or precious things,’ a notion that is broad-
er than “full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession”
of lands and resources.134 Article III guarantees to all
Ma¯ori the same rights as all other British subjects.135
In any event, despite the disagreement over the
different meanings in the English and Ma¯ori versions
there is consensus that the Treaty sets a particular
kind of relationship between the Crown and Ma¯ori.
This relationship is generally understood as a ‘part-
nership,’136which, according to the interpretation given
by courts and the Waitangi Tribunal, imposes on the
parties the obligation “to act reasonably, honourably,
and in good faith.”137 The partnership between Ma¯ori
and the Crown entails the duty to consult Ma¯ori
before adopting any measure that could affect them.138
The obligation to consult parallels the standards on
consultation and participation established in ILO
Convention 169 in 1989.139
Furthermore, legislation passed in the 1990s and
its case law have established as a good practice con-
sultation with indigenous peoples when preparing
plans or policy statements, or changes to plans or
policy statements.140 Lately, in 2002, the Local Gov-
ernment Act (LGA) 2002 imposed “new require-
ments for local authorities on consultation and to
undertake capacity-building for Ma¯ori,” 141 thus
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130 See PHILIP A. JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND § 3.1 (2nd ed. 2001); Douglas Graham, The New Zealand Government’s 
Policy, in RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 5 (Alison Quentin-Baxter, ed. 1998); Noel Cox, The Treaty of Waitangi and the relationship
between the Crown and Ma¯ori in New Zealand 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 123, 125 (2002-2003) (stressing that “[t]he Treaty of Waitangi. . . has long been
regarded as New Zealand’s founding document”).
131 See E.M. Brookfield, Waitangi & Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law & Legitimation 105-06 (2nd ed. 2006).
132 Waitangi Tribunal, Motunui-Waitara Claim Report: Wai 6 (2 ed., Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1983) cited in GEOFFREY PALMER & MATTHEW PALMER, 
BRIDLED POWER. NEW ZEALAND’S CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 334 (4th ed., 2004).
133 See Treaty of Waitangi, U.K.-Ma¯ori, adopted in Feb. 6, 1840, Article I: “The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the
separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and
without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or
may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole sovereigns thereof.” The Ma¯ori version reads as follows: “Ko
nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu –
te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.”
134 Article II: “Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and
individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may
collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United Tribes
and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alien-
ate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that
behalf.” In Te Reo: “Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangitira ki nga hapu—ki nga tangata katoa o Nu Tirani te tino rangatiratan-
ga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa atu ka tuku ki te
Kuini te hokonga o era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona te Wenua—ki te ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei e te
Kuini hei kai hoko mona.”
135 Article III: “In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to
them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects.” The Ma¯ori version states: “Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te wakaaetanga ki te
Kawanatanga o te Kuini—Ka tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata ma¯ori katoa o Nu Tirani ka tukua ki a ratou nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana
mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani.” 
136 See New Zealand Ma¯ori Council v. Attorney General [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 644 (CA) (“the Treaty signified a partnership between races”; Treaty of
Waitangi Act 1975, 1975 S.N.Z. No. 114, Art. 4(2A)(a) (referring to the Treaty parties as in a partnership relation). See also Ann Sullivan, The Treaty of
Waitangi and Social Well-being: Justice, Representation, and Participation in WAITANGI REVISITED: PERSPECTIVES ON THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 123, 123 
raising the standard much in the same way as it has
occurred in international human rights law. Indeed,
the New Zealand government equates one of the
most important provisions in the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples—the principle of
informed consent—with the provisions enshrined in
the Treaty of Waitangi.142 In Article 10, the Declara-
tion states
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly
removed from their lands or territories. No
relocation shall take place without the free,
prior and informed consent of the indigenous
peoples concerned and after agreement on
just and fair compensation and, where possi-
ble, with the option of return.
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(M. Belgrave, M. Kawharu and D. Williams eds., 2005) (“there is considerable agreement between the courts and the [Waitangi] Tribunal that Treaty
principles refer to a partnership between Ma¯ori and the Crown...”).
137 Sullivan, supra note 117, at 123.
138 Sullivan notes, “[the] duty to make informed decisions...implies that within the principle of partnership there is an obligation to consult and to pro-
vide adequate time for the consultation process. Id.
139 Article 6 of ILO Convention 169 proclaims that “Governments shall:
(a) Consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever considera-
tion is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly;
(b) Establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of
decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them;
(c) Establish means for the full development of these peoples’ own institutions and initiatives, and in appropriate cases provide the resources neces-
sary for this purpose.
2. The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances,
with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.
140 The main statute where consultation has been required is the Resource Management Act 1991. The New Zealand Ministry for the Environment has
stated that “[a]pplicants have a duty to report on consultation when constructing an assessment of environmental effects, but this does not amount
to a legal duty to consult...Despite this, it is recognized good practice that applicants for resource consents should engage in consultation with 
tangata whenua [i.e., the people of the land] where their proposals may affect” the relationship of Ma¯ori and their culture and traditions with their
ancestral lands, waters and other sites, the protection of historic heritage from inappropriate subdivision, and the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. See Guidelines for Consulting with Tangata Whenua under the RMA. An Update on Case Law, Ministry for the Environment, 2003, at 3,
available at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/guidelines-tangata-whenua-dec03/case-law-tangata-whenua.pdf. 
141 Id., at 7 (“Section 81 of LGA 2002 requires local authorities to establish processes to provide opportunities for Ma¯ori to contribute to decision-mak-
ing. Section 82 sets out standard principles for local authorities to follow when undertaking consultation, and specifically requires local authorities
to adopt processes to consult with Ma¯ori in accordance with these principles.”)
142 One day after the vote at the United Nations, Ma¯ori Affairs Minister, Parekura Horomia, affirmed that New Zealand has “some of the most extensive
consultation mechanisms in the world.” Horomia specifically referenced to “the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, including the principle of
informed consent,” as being enshrined in New Zealand’s domestic law. See “Ma¯ori Party’s head in the clouds,” Scoop, September 14, 2007, available
at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0709/S00272.htm (emphasis added).
In 1840, over 200 Ma¯ori chiefs and the 
representatives of the Queen of England
signed a treaty that would set the framework
for the relationship between the settlers 
and the native Ma¯ori population. The Treaty is
“widely held to be New Zealand’s founding
document,” and is considered applicable to all
Ma¯ori as official policy.
Thus, notwithstanding New Zealand’s no vote on the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, to
honor the Treaty of Waitangi the government must
seek prior and informed consent from Ma¯ori when-
ever a decision that may affect them is to be adopt-
ed. Furthermore, this principle has application in a
wide range of issues, from lands and resources, to
political participation and, as shown in this report,
addressing domestic violence. 
1. Domestic violence in New Zealand:
the current situation
Domestic violence is a significant issue in New
Zealand. Despite the government’s effort to tackle it,
the levels of violence within the family, particularly
violence against women, remain surprisingly high.
Information regarding domestic violence—or “family
violence,” as it usually called in New Zealand—is
everywhere. A large media campaign airs TV ads
and radio announcements along with posters and
flyers saying “It’s not OK!” to use violence.143 Even
bank teller machines flash messages about the need
to combat family violence in New Zealand.144 The
news often reports incidents of domestic violence.145
Many governmental agencies’ websites have links to
emergency services for victims of domestic violence.
A large network of non-governmental organizations,
mostly funded by the government, also provide
frontline services and support, advocate for victims
and survivors, and conduct studies on domestic vio-
lence. The level of awareness is thus fairly high.
Some of New Zealand’s most noticeable art and
literature directly speak about domestic violence—or,
more generally, about violence and discrimination
against women. The characters of the award-winning
novel The Bone People are locked in violent and
unhealthy relationships, despite their love for each
other.146 Paikea, the 12 year-old character of the
acclaimed film Whale Rider, struggles with her
grandfather’s refusal to allow her become the tribe’s
leader, in a film that offers a fine discussion of gen-
der roles within Ma¯ori tribes.147 Domestic violence is
the major theme of the widely acclaimed film Once
Were Warriors, a crude depiction of an urban Ma¯ori
family’s marginalization and resort to alcohol, drugs
and abuse.148 The two films received praise both
nationally and at the international level. 
Domestic violence studies may adopt different
perspectives. They may examine domestic violence
using a public health approach, as the most-cited
study on the subject in New Zealand does.149 Public
health analyses may be complemented with cost-
based perspectives, which put emphasis on the
heavy economic burden a state must bear when
dealing with domestic violence.150 Such economic
costs not only relate to the wellbeing of women who
are victims of domestic violence (and their children)
but also “the costs associated with political and
social instability through intergenerational transmis-
sion of violence.” 151 Finally, one can also adopt an
international human rights framework to analyze the
problem, that is, a perspective that examines a state’s
response to violence against women as a form of dis-
crimination and the existence of larger structures of
subordination.152 This report embraces such an
approach.
In New Zealand, it is generally stated that one in
three women has been a victim of domestic violence.
More precisely, according to Fanslow’s and Robin-
son’s prevalence study, 
[f]or those women aged 15 and over, at least
one act of physical violence inflicted by non-
partners was reported by approximately 1 in 6
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143 See http://www.areyouok.org.nz/.
144 Upon landing in New Zealand, a member of the Leitner Center’s delegation retrieved money from a teller machine and caught a picture of the
machine’s screen message once she had made the withsdrawal. The screen showed the following message: “Stop for New Zealand’s Biggest Morn-
ing Tea and help prevent domestic violence, 9-20 June 2008.”
145 See, for instance, Gisborne Herald, “We should be outraged,” Nov. 26, 2007 (reporting on the outrage following the murder or a woman killed by her
former partner); Moana Tipu, “When enough is enough. Breaking the cycle of domestic violence,” NZine magazine (reprinted from the Ngai Tahu
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146 KERI HULME, THE BONE PEOPLE (1984). The novel was awarded the Booker Prize for Fiction and the Penguin Prize for Literature in 1985.
147 “Whale Rider,” directed by Niki Caro, 2002.
148 “Once Were Warriors,” directed by Lee Tamahori, 1994.
149 See Janet Fanslow and Elizabeth Robinson, Violence against women in New Zealand: prevalence and health consequences, Vol. 117 No 1206 JOURNAL
OF THE NEW ZEALAND MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/117-1206/1173/.
150 Scholars in New Zealand conducted this type of study in the early 1990s. See Suzanne Snively, The New Zealand economic cost of family violence in
SOCIAL POLICY JOURNAL OF NEW ZEALAND Vol. 4 (Jul. 1995), available at http://www.msd.govt.nz/publications/journal/04-july-1995/index.html#8. 
II: Domestic violence in New Zealand: 
Problems with the existing law and regulations 
and “implementation gaps”
participants, while sexual violence was report-
ed by approximately 1 in 10 women. Approx-
imately 1 in 3 ever-partnered women reported
that they had experienced at least one act of
physical and/or sexual violence by an inti-
mate partner, and experience of physical
and/or sexual violence by a current or previ-
ous intimate partner within the previous 12
months was reported by approximately 5% of
respondents.153
As the same study explains, its findings are consis-
tent with official data at the time: the 2001 New
Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims (NZN-
SCV) reported that 26.4% of women had been phys-
ically abused by an intimate partner at least once in
their lifetime.154 Despite the level of assaults and
threats being “so high” and “unusual compared to
other crime surveys”—assaults accounted for 26% of
all crimes and threats accounted for 22%—the sur-
vey acknowledges that, by including “partners or
people well known”—which the survey aims not to
include—there could be double counting of offens-
es.155 Moreover, the crime survey states that “it is dif-
ficult to be more precise about the proportion of Vic-
tim Forms that related to partners or people who
were well known,” thus leaving the number of
domestic violence incidents largely unknown.156 As
we discuss below, the lack of available data on
domestic violence is a serious, and largely unattend-
ed, problem in New Zealand.
There is consensus that New Zealand has sound
legislation on domestic violence. Yet, New Zealand
still has a serious problem eliminating violence
against women. As the Governor-General has
observed, New Zealand has “some of the best legis-
lation in the world (the Children, Young Persons and
Their Families Act 1989 and the Domestic Violence
Act 1995) and among the worst of performances.” 157
The following sections detail some of the problems
that New Zealand faces when dealing with domestic
violence. First, we examine areas in which the law
as written should be modified to better address the
concerns and needs of victims, survivors, perpetra-
tors and the community at large. Second, we focus
on the lack of implementation of some of the law’s
provisions. 
2. Problems with the law and 
regulations as written
Although the current legislation and regulations on
domestic violence are generally considered good,
there are areas in which improvement should be
made. The following section details some of the
problems that the current law “as written” presents.
The information we present here was mostly gath-
ered through interviews while the Leitner Center
delegation visited the country in May 2008.
A. ACCESS TO PROGRAMS
As mandated by the DVA 1995, once a Court grants
a protection order it must direct respondents to
attend stopping violence programs, “unless the Court
considers that there is good reason for not making
such a direction.”158 As stated on the National Net-
work of Stopping Violence Services’ website, vio-
lence programs aim to help people “wanting to
resolve problems in their lives caused by violence:
women who are wanting to leave or have left violent
relationships, children and young people affected by
violence, men who want to get in charge of violent
and abusive behavior and become better partners,
dads, friends and workmates.” 159 The importance of
these programs in helping to prevent and eliminate
domestic violence cannot be underestimated. There-
fore, it is important to scrutinize both their availabil-
ity and their effectiveness. 
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153 See Janet Fanslow and Elizabeth Robinson, Violence against women in New Zealand: prevalence and health consequences, Vol. 117 No 1206 JOURNAL
OF THE NEW ZEALAND MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/117-1206/1173/.
154 New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey 2001 (2003), at 139, available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2003/victims-survey/index.html.
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ing] been physically violent to an intimate partner in their lifetime.” Id. The 2005 NZNSCV failed to report specifically on intimate partner abuse.
155 New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey 2006. Key Findings, § 2.3, available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2007/crime-safety-survey-
2006/key-findings/chapter-2.html#22a.
156 Id.
157 Ian Hassall and Janet Fanslow, Family violence in New Zealand; we can do better, JOURNAL OF THE NEW ZEALAND MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Vol. 199 No. 1228
(2006), available at http://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/119-1228/1830/.
158 DVA 1995, § 32(1).
159 See http://www.nnsvs.org.nz/aboutus/index.aspx. The NNSVS is comprised by 53 member agencies across the country. Interview with Brian Gardner,
National Manager, NNSVS, Wellington (May 19, 2008). 
Poor support for self-referrals
Generally, only men who are referred to stop-
ping violence programs through the courts are eligi-
ble to attend such programs free of charge. As the
coordinator of a Family Court observed, there is “not
equality of access” to these services.160 According to
the current legislation and regulations, there are
(mandatory) programs for respondents and (volun-
tary) programs for applicants. As a result, the govern-
ment provides funding to the specialized agencies
that provide such services.161 The law, however, does
not actively support self-referrals, that is, there is lit-
tle (or no) funding for men who voluntarily seek help
through these programs. As officials from the Min-
istry of Justice acknowledged, they provide funding
“only if [men are] referred through courts, as well as
other court mandated programs.” 162
Because men who voluntarily attend stopping
violence programs may be more likely to change vio-
lent behaviors, the government should give special
attention and support to these cases. In reality, the
opposite tends to happen. Frontline service
providers consider the lack of funding for self-refer-
rals a problem. The National Network of Stopping
Violence Services’ (NNSVS) National Manager,
Brian Gardner, remarked that there is “not enough
[funding] to cover the entire costs” for men who self-
refer to the programs.163 One service provider com-
plained that “the government only funds 20 non-
mandated self-referrals, but I get approximately 5
times more than that!” 164 Similarly, the manager of
another stopping violence program observed: “for
self-referrals there is a charge of 30 [NZ] dollars per
session and the vast majority don’t pay. If they can’t
afford it then we wear the costs. It’s not good busi-
ness but we have to ask ourselves what our intention
is.” 165 He further remarked that if the purpose is to
reduce violence then the programs have no choice
but to absorb the costs of non-paying clients.166 Finally,
there is a cost-based consideration: stopping violence
programs are cheaper than incarcerating a person.
As one provider remarked, “it costs about $60,000
per year to incarcerate someone but only $3,000 to
send them to a stopping violence program.” 167 The
duty to prevent violence from occurring mandates
that the state actively support men’s self-referrals to
stopping violence programs—particularly, as the
number of self-referrals has only increased since the
government’s public awareness campaigns.168
Programs for women
In a similar vein, women who want to attend
protected-persons programs cannot always do so
free of charge if a protection order was granted more
than 3 years ago, or if they do not apply for a protec-
tion order. Some protected-persons program
providers require a court referral (and therefore
court funding) for women to come to their programs.
Others offer a sliding scale.169 Women’s ability to
attend protected- persons programs should not
depend on their seeking a protection order (or their
ability to pay). Sometimes women may not want to
bring their case before a judge, yet they still may
want to “do something” to deal with a violent situa-
tion. The obligation to seek a protection order may
prevent women from attending these programs in
practice. 
B. ACCESS TO LEGAL AID 
One of the most important features of a comprehen-
sive strategy to eliminate domestic violence is a
proper response from courts. Consequently, it is cru-
cial that victims of domestic violence have prompt
access to the courts. Many interviewees observed
that applying and obtaining a protection order is not
as easy as it should be. In the words of Brian Gard-
ner, the National Manager of NNSVS, the process to
get a protection order is “the opposite of free, easy and
safe.”170 Different reasons account for this opinion. 
First, many applicants who do not meet the
threshold for legal aid but still earn a low salary, have
to pay for a lawyer to prepare their protection order
application. This can be very costly. Even police offi-
cers acknowledge the problem with lack of access to
legal aid. “If women don’t qualify for legal aid, the
average cost is about NZD 1,000 [in Invercargill].
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160 Interview with Robert Loo, Family Court Coordinator & Chairman, Family Violence Focus Group, Invercargill (May 14, 2008). 
161 The Network’s agencies are ‘not for profit’ community agencies that receive funding “from a wide range of government agencies, charitable trusts,
and donations.” Id.
162 Interview with Alison Stephens, Ministry of Justice, Wellington (May 21, 2008). 
163 Interview with Brian Gardner, National Manager, National Network of Stopping Violence Services, Wellington (May 19, 2008). 
164 Interview with Service Provider.
165 Interview with the Manager of a Stopping Violence Program. 
166 Id.
167 Interview with Stopping Violence Program. 
168 Since the “It’s Not OK” campaign there has been double the number of non-mandated male participants in the men’s programs. Interview with
Andrew Treacher, Men’s Program Coordinator, NNSVS, Wellington (May 19, 2008). 
Women can get help from the community law office
or self-represent. [However] if the judge does not like
the content of the affidavit, he will discharge the
application and the woman can’t apply for another
[protection order]. It is a problem when women don’t
have a lawyer…”171 Police Family Violence Coordi-
nators share this opinion: “it is appalling you have to
pay to be safe. If you need legal protection, it could
be NZD 800-1,500 for legal costs. If the respondent
contests the protection order, the applicant owes
even more.” 172 Specialized family lawyers summarize
this dramatically: “it is financially unsustainable to
assist women in getting protection orders, because
there is not enough funding.” 173 Lynn Ginty, a work-
er at Nelson Rape Crisis since 2002 who previously
worked with Women’s Refuge, thinks women should
not have to pay for lawyers when applying for a pro-
tection order.174 Neville Robertson, a prominent
domestic violence researcher in New Zealand, thinks
likewise: “[t]here are too many hurdles to getting a
protection order: the cost, junior level lawyers doing
all the applications . . . it needs to be free and easy.” 175
Ginty further observed, “if the government were seri-
ous about stopping domestic violence, it would sub-
sidize protection orders.” 176
Second, attorneys who have very little experi-
ence are the ones who generally provide legal aid. A
senior attorney explained that young lawyers do legal
aid to gain experience.177 Because domestic violence
incidents are particularly complex, there should be
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169 Interview with Holly Carrington, Services Manager, Preventing Violence in the Home, Auckland (May 12, 2008).
170 Interview with Brian Gardner, National Manager, National Network of Stopping Violence Services, Wellington (May 19, 2008). 
171 Interview with Sergeant Margaret Windle, Police Family Violence Coordinator, Invercargill (May 14, 2008). 
172 Interview with Pegeen O’Rourke, Police Family Violence Coordinator, Christchurch (May 13, 2008). 
173 Interview with Alexander Ashmore, barrister, Mahon & Associates, Auckland (May 14, 2008). 
174 Interview with Lynn Ginty, Nelson Rape Crisis, Nelson (May 16, 2008). 
175 Interview with Neville Robertson, Senior Lecturer, University of Waikato Law School, Hamilton (May 15, 2008). 
176 Interview with Lynn Ginty, Nelson Rape Crisis, Nelson (May 16, 2008). 
177 Interview with Shelley Gray, attorney, Invercargill, May 15, 2008. Gray remarked remuneration for legal aid is “dreadful ...an attorney with
6 years of experience may charge anything from NZD 250 to NZD 400 per hour.” The rates for legal aid are NZD 140 per hour. 
The lack of legal services available to women who face domestic violence situations can be even graver 
when it comes to immigrant women. In Christchurch, there was an incident where a Filipina woman was unable
to get legal status because she did not get the final protection order. The director of the only ethnic women’s
refuge in the city explained that the client did not have legal representation and “the judge’s comments 
indicated that the judge thought the woman just wanted the final protection order for immigration purposes,
even though she had documented abuse....”
efforts to attract senior lawyers to take protection
orders’ applications and domestic violence cases
more generally. Domestic violence cases require par-
ticular skills, which need time to develop. Alexander
Ashmore, a barrister in Auckland, made a worrying
statement: “young lawyers are scared of hearings.” 178
Third, in some places, the lack of incentives for
lawyers to take these cases can result in a total
absence of lawyers. Lynn Ginty, from Nelson Rape
Crisis, pointed out that over the 2007 Christmas
break, “no lawyers were available to help women
through Women’s Refuge, so women would call
Rape Crisis. Rape Crisis would refer women to the
Law Institute, who would then refer them to lawyers
in Christchurch.” 179 One Ma¯ori service provider said
that “legal aid lawyers are a dying breed.”180 She
observed that in Palmerston North, for instance, they
have no legal aid whatsoever.181
The lack of legal services available to women
who face domestic violence situations can be even
graver when it comes to immigrant women. In
Christchurch, there was an incident where a Filipina
woman was unable to get legal status because she
did not get the final protection order. The director of
the only ethnic women’s refuge in the city explained
that the client did not have legal representation and
“the judge’s comments indicated that the judge
thought the woman just wanted the final protection
order for immigration purposes, even though she
had documented abuse. . . the woman also missed
the appeals process, because she had no lawyer.”182
Several service providers observed that “self-repre-
sented women have less validity in the eyes of the
judges.”183 A judge at a Family Violence Court con-
firmed this perception: “even if [self-represented
women] are educated and intelligent they don’t
always get it right as if they had a lawyer.”184
C. LACK OF MANDATORY AND 
ADEQUATE TRAINING
In order to appropriately address domestic violence
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incidents and their consequences, public officials
and frontline service providers need to be adequate-
ly trained. In New Zealand, the lack of mandatory
training for some officials in key positions may seri-
ously undermine the country’s obligation to combat
and eliminate domestic violence. As we discuss
below, several people identified as a major problem
the absence of coherent and robust training policies.
New Zealand has successfully brought the issue into
the spotlight—programs have been put in place,
reports and working papers are constantly released,
and there is highly organized civil society which
pushes the matter. Yet New Zealand could do more.
In the words of one government official, “training is
patchy. . . and not good.”185
Police
Police are often the first to intervene when a
domestic violence incident occurs. Consequently,
their response can determine to a large extent how
the case will unfold. Police not only show up at the
scene of an incident—they also prosecute cases.
Police prosecutors appear in many of the less serious
criminal charges in the District Court, and in prelim-
inary hearings of some serious charges. Hence,
police need to know exactly what kind of evidence
they should collect; how they should gather that
information; who they need to talk to, when, etc.
There is agreement that police do not receive
adequate training on domestic violence. Judge Peter
Boshier stated: “There is not enough training for the
police and court staff on family violence.”186 Similar-
ly, staff from the National Collective of Independent
Women’s Refuges commented that “police only get 6
hours of training on domestic violence in 6 weeks of
training.”187 Holly Carrington, from Preventing Violence
in the Home, observed that “training on domestic
violence does not give [police] the needed under-
standing of why domestic violence happens.”188 As
explained below, one of the most cited problems is
the police’s failure to enforce protection orders—or,
more generally, the laws and regulations on violence
against women. As Judge Peter Boshier stated it: “it is
fair to say that some police prosecutors are not well
trained and sensitive to the issues. Some old school
prosecutors just want to get it through, and are quick
to amend a charge down to common assault.”189 Staff
from Preventing Violence in the Home made the
same remark: “Auckland prosecutors just want expe-
diency in cases, and have good intentions, but don’t
always have adequate training or look out for safety
of women.”190 The lack of training is problematic since
it can cause a significant imbalance between the
victim, who is represented by an overworked police-
man who is not a qualified lawyer, and the respondent,
who often has a fully qualified and trained defense
attorney.
Police receive a small amount of training on
domestic violence. As noted above, according to
NGO workers, police only get 6 hours of training on
domestic violence.191 In Invercargill, the Police Fami-
ly Violence Coordinator told us that police have 4
hours of formal training on domestic violence
issues.192 In Christchurch, police officers receive “at
least 5 1/2 hours of training dealing with protection
orders, investigations [and] prosecutions.”193 As a
result of this poor training, some women expressed
concern with the government’s initiative to increase
the power of police to issue on the spot protection
orders—one of the proposals that came out of the
DVA 1995 review process, which was announced in
June 2008.194 It became clear that the absence of a
uniform, nationally coordinated policy on police
training affects the government’s effort to prevent
and eliminate domestic violence notwithstanding
their legal obligation to do so.
Judges
Judges play a crucial role in protecting women
who are victims of violence. Judges hear applications
for protection orders, oversee men’s attendance to
stopping violence programs, and decide on convic-
tions against perpetrators.Also, judges’work can have
an impact on the prevention of violence—if men see
that protection orders are granted, or perpetrators get
serious sentences for using violence or for breaches of
protection orders, they may be deterred from engag-
ing in this behavior. Notwithstanding the critical role
of judges, the law does not contemplate mandatory
training for judges on domestic violence issues. 
Domestic violence service providers think judges’
knowledge about domestic violence is too narrow.
NGO workers remarked that judges have “no real
understanding of the dynamics of fear. [They have]
no information on what happens after; [they] don’t
understand retaliation acts. [The] ones who were
lawyers in Family Court know a bit more but strug-
gle with psychological abuse and signs of it.” 195 Solic-
itors echoed this idea: “a lot of judges in the past
were trained about the issue; new up and comers
are not being trained. Nowadays they assume that
they will pick it up through experience.” 196
The Ministry of Justice deems that it would
affect the judiciary’s independence should judges be
subject to mandatory training, even in the face of
international law standards that call for the training
of judges. “International committees always recom-
mend judge training, but they only look at judges’
failure in the process, when it’s actually a larger
issue… Judges have control over their own training
programs.” 197 The officials’ remarks are consistent
with the opinion of the Principal Family Court, Peter
Boshier: “The Institute of Judicial Studies recom-
mends some training for judges, but not too much
because the judges would rebel.” 198
Women’s Refuge has delivered training to
judges, although not as part of a consistent national
policy. Women’s Refuge staff affirmed that judges
should receive much more training: “[w]e have had
two opportunities to deliver trainings and both were
half an hour!” 199 Judge David Mather, at the Wait-
akere Family Violence Court, acknowledged: “we,
judges, need training.” 200
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Lawyers
Although women may self-represent to obtain
protection orders, it is not an easy process and
women benefit significantly from legal representa-
tion. “Preventing Violence in the Home suggests that
women get lawyers,” says PVH’s Services Manager,
Holly Carrington.201 “Even though they’re only filling
out an affidavit of the witness, it’s hard to get protec-
tion orders, increasingly so, and lawyers know which
criteria they have to meet in the witness state-
ment.” 202 Or, as Judge Peter Boshier told us: “Because
women have less access to legal aid, they have trou-
ble meeting the evidentiary requirements and can-
not get a protection order for that reason.” 203
Lawyers get to know about these criteria only
through practice, however, for there is no contem-
plated training in law schools’ curricula. As a result,
some think all law schools should require future
lawyers be trained on the issues surrounding
domestic violence and protection orders.204 The lack
of training is not only a problem with future
lawyers, but also with practicing lawyers. “There’s
no training at all for lawyers. Optional training costs
about $300. On the Domestic Violence Standing
Committee, which is conservative, lawyers take a
gender-neutral approach. There has been talk about
developing guidelines for lawyers because there’s
no guidance or training for lawyers. There’s no way
to mandate [training].” 205 In the words of experi-
enced family lawyers, “training for lawyers needs to
be refreshed.” 206
Benefits officers 
Benefits officers from Work and Income New
Zealand (WINZ)—the government agency that pro-
vides financial assistance and employment services
throughout the country—receive a fairly large num-
ber of domestic violence disclosures, from victims as
well as from perpetrators. Only in 2006-2007, there
were about 4,000 family disclosures to WINZ staff.207
Within WINZ, there are 26 FamilyViolence Response
Coordinators who support, mentor and provide advice
to Work and Income officers on family violence
matters, safety issues and services across the coun-
try.208 Family Violence Coordinators operate on a co-
delivery model with local NGO and family violence
agencies to deliver family violence awareness train-
ing to the WINZ staff. Clients are given resource kits,
which include information on Women’s Refuge, local
services, crisis plans, and the impact of family
violence on children.209
There is also a Family Violence Intervention
Programme (FVIP) training which is provided to
front-line Work and Income and Benefit Control staff.
The training consists of a one-day session, co-deliv-
ered by Work and Income and NGO trainers with
presentations from other NGO service providers.210 It
covers issues such as prevalence of family violence,
its definition, causes, social context, dynamics, indi-
cators, effects, and practice sessions (such as routine
screening). There is also refresher training for staff
that has been employed longer provided by the
Family Violence Response Coordinators. “But the
problem with refresher training,” a Family Violence
Response Coordinator acknowledged, “is having time
to release the case managers so that they can attend
the refresher training.” 211
Staff members acknowledge that the training is
meant as an introduction, and is not intended to
replace skilled intervention from family violence
specialists.212 Moreover, Katie O’Donnell, the Family
Violence Response Co-Coordinator in Wellington,
said that despite the fact that every person should
be routinely screened, “some staff are not ready to
ask those questions [on family violence].” 213 Given
the prevalence of domestic violence in New
Zealand, frontline staff should conduct mandatory
screening of all clients. Also, there should be incen-
tives for staff to enroll in refresher training. 
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D. FAILURE TO REQUIRE DATA COLLECTION
In February 2007, the CEDAW Committee reviewed
New Zealand’s periodic report on compliance with
the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The
Committee noted the “need to improve availability of
reliable and in-depth data on domestic violence.” 214
In August 2007, after New Zealand appeared before
the Committee, the Committee observed “that insuf-
ficient statistical data disaggregated by sex in all areas
covered by the Convention [made] it more difficult
to assess accurately the situation and progress of
different groups of women with regard to all areas
covered by the Convention,” including violence
against women.215
The current laws and regulations fail to ade-
quately address this important topic. New Zealand
acknowledged before the CEDAW Committee that
data collection, particularly on the number of convic-
tions for domestic violence incidents, “is not. . . com-
prehensive.” 216 In its response to the Committee, the
government stated that the “[t]he Taskforce forAction
on Violence within Families [had] identified as a pri-
ority the need to ensure comprehensive family vio-
lence data” 217 without detailing the specific measures
to be adopted. It comes as no surprise then that the
Committee eventually called upon New Zealand
to consider using measures such as bench-
marks, targets, recruitment and support pro-
grammes, incentives and quotas with regard
to various articles of the Convention and to
strengthen its system of data collection in all
areas covered by the Convention, in order to
enhance its knowledge base about the actual
situation of different groups of women and to
track trends over time. It also calls upon the
State party to monitor, through measurable
indicators, the impact of measures taken and
progress achieved towards the realization of
de facto equality for women. It encourages the
State party to use these data and indicators in
the formulation of laws, policies and pro-
grammes for the effective implementation of
the Convention.218
The absence of available data encompasses several
areas: enforcement of protection orders, the effec-
tiveness of stopping violence programs, the number
of convictions for domestic violence incidents, and
so forth. 
In some instances, available data is problematic
and may be difficult to use for comparative purposes.
Like in other places, available data in New Zealand
does not necessarily comprise all women who may
be victims of domestic violence. Radha Balakrishnan,
principal policy and research analyst at the Families
Commission, observed that since questionnaires on
family violence “are framed differently [it is] harder to
compare data from subsequent years,” adding that
police “haven’t collected data well enough to recog-
nize it is an issue.” 219
Similarly, there is no mandated data collection to
assess the effectiveness of men’s stopping violence
programs. Brian Gardner, the National Manager of
the Stopping Violence Services Network, remarked
that “it’s often difficult to make sense of the data.” 220
Gardner, more generally, said that “the number of
deaths related to domestic violence has been rising
[yet] it’s difficult to get information.” 221 Parekotuku
Moore, the National Director of Ma¯ori Development,
echoed Gardner’s remarks: “we are not funded well
enough to have a really robust system of data to
know who is coming through our programs.” 222As we
explain in the following section, the lack of attention
given to these programs is particularly problematic.
Scholars argue that New Zealand should be able
to produce, collect and disseminate data without too
much effort: “New Zealand is a little country—it
shouldn’t be hard to evaluate and to have statistics,”
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observed Ruth Herbert, a private consultant who
wrote a thesis on domestic violence in New
Zealand.223 According to Herbert, “the government
has not been willing to pay NGOs to collect data.” 224
Judge David Mather made a similar point when
asked whether the government had any interest on
compiling statistics. His response left no room for
doubt: “No.” 225 Moreover, Judge Mather commented
that the Ministry of Justice’s statistics “are not so
fresh,” referring us to the research conducted by
scholars at Massey University. Leigh Coombes, a
lecturer in psychology at Massey University and one
of the researchers who conducted the study on the
Waitakere Court, confirmed the government’s lack of
interest in serious data collection. She observed that
“judges at Waitakere wanted the Court evaluated, but
the Ministry of Justice was not on board, so the
judges asked Massey University.” 226
Scholars believe that the government could do
better fighting domestic violence if strategies were
based on research and evidence: 
unless initiatives and strategies are based on
evidence, or can be critiqued by researchers
and strategists to add some ‘pseudo’ analysis,
then the prioritisation and decision making
around which initiatives and strategies to
adopt for implementation ends up being based
on an arbitrary decision making process rather
than good science. And the arbitrary decision
making process can fall victim to power and
control dynamics as people jostle to get their
issues on the list.227
The New Zealand Family Violence Clearing-
house’s Chief Researcher confirmed Herbert’s
remarks. He acknowledged that the Clearinghouse’s
goal is “to break down the silos,” 228 adding that there
is a lack of evaluation of best practices, culturally
appropriate approaches to domestic violence, infor-
mation on elder abuse, and that research on evalua-
tion accounts for less than 10% of the research.229
However, it is unclear whether the government’s
ultimate goal for creating the Clearinghouse was to
share info with the NGO community or to provide
information to policy-makers.” 230
The Leitner Center delegation had the opportu-
nity to question government officials about New
Zealand’s failure to collect data in light of the inter-
national bodies’ recommendations, such as the
CEDAW Committee’s reports. One government offi-
cial acknowledged that this is a problem that was not
limited to domestic violence: “New Zealand does not
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The Leitner Center delegation had the opportunity
to question government officials about New Zealand’s
failure to collect data in light of the international 
bodies’ recommendations, such as the CEDAW
Committee’s reports. One government official
acknowledged that this is a problem that was not
limited to domestic violence: “New Zealand does not
have enough data on anything.”
have enough data on anything.” 231 When asked about
the lack of data on stopping violence programs’ effec-
tiveness, this official concluded: “It’s actually very
hard to do effectiveness research.” 232
In this context, the importance of the CEDAW
Committee’s final recommendation to New Zealand
is clear. The CEDAW Committee called upon New
Zealand “to ensure that adequate data is collected on
all forms of violence against women and [urges] the
State party to conduct research on the prevalence,
causes and consequences of violence against all
groups of women to serve as the basis for compre-
hensive and targeted intervention.” 233
Conclusions and Recommendations
ACCESS TO PROGRAMS
Conclusion:
Under the DVA 1995 and its implementing reg-
ulations, the government provides funding to spe-
cialized agencies that provide stopping violence
services. Funding goes only to court-mandated pro-
grams, however. There is little or no funding for men
who voluntarily seek help through these programs,
notwithstanding that these men may be more likely
to change violent behavior. 
Recommendation:
To better comply with its duty to prevent vio-
lence from occurring, New Zealand should actively
support men’s self-referrals to stopping violence pro-
grams—particularly as the number of self-referrals
has increased in response to the government’s pub-
lic awareness campaign.
Conclusion:
On many occasions, men who begin stopping
violence programs drop out without completing the
program. When courts mandate men to attend such
programs, and men fail to attend, there are legal
avenues available. However, men who self-refer do
not have a legal obligation to remain in the program.
Recommendation:
The government should consider implementing
incentives for men to complete the whole program
so as to ensure that all efforts to prevent violence
from occurring are made.
Conclusion:
Women who want to attend protected-persons
programs may have to pay to attend such programs
if they have not applied for a protection order or if
they were granted a protection order more than 3
years ago. As a result, a woman’s ability to attend a
protected-persons program may depend upon her
seeking a protection order or her ability to pay.
Recommendation:
In order to better comply with its duty to prevent
incidents of domestic violence and address the struc-
tural causes of such violence, New Zealand should
actively support the participation of women in pro-
tected-persons programs, by establishing incentives
and facilitating women’s access to these programs.
LEGAL AID
Conclusion:
Under international law, New Zealand has an
obligation to provide safe and prompt access to jus-
tice for victims and survivors of domestic violence,
including free legal aid where necessary. The process
of obtaining a protection order is complex and, in
reality, requires the assistance of an attorney. For
women who cannot afford a private attorney but
who also do not qualify for legal aid, it may be finan-
cially unsustainable to obtain an order of protection. 
Recommendation:
To better comply with its international legal obli-
gations, the government should consider providing
legal aid for all women applying for protection
orders. 
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Conclusion:
In many cases, the lawyers who provide legal
aid are junior lawyers who take such cases to gain
experience. As a result, the attorneys who handle
these cases may lack the experience necessary to
handle the complex issues that arise in domestic vio-
lence cases. Further, in some areas, the lack of incen-
tives for lawyers to take legal aid cases has resulted
in a complete absence of legal aid lawyers.
Recommendation:
The government should implement incentives to
attract senior lawyers to provide legal aid for victims
and survivors of domestic violence in order to
ensure adequate legal representation for the victims
and survivors of domestic violence. Additionally, in
order to comply with its obligation to provide safe
and prompt access to justice for victims and sur-
vivors of domestic violence, including free legal aid
where necessary, New Zealand must ensure access
to legal aid attorneys for survivors of domestic vio-
lence where such attorneys are needed. 
TRAINING
Conclusion:
Police play an essential role in addressing
domestic violence. They are the first to respond
when a domestic violence incident occurs and they
also prosecute many of the less-serious offenses in
court. Yet there is no uniform, nationally-coordinated
policy on police training related to issues of domes-
tic violence. This affects the government’s effort to
prevent and eliminate violence against women. 
Recommendation:
In order to comply with its obligation to prevent
domestic violence and to impartially and seriously
investigate acts of domestic violence, New Zealand
should implement a uniform program of training for
all police on responding to situations of domestic
violence.
Conclusion:
Both judges and lawyers play an essential role in
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protecting women who are victims of domestic vio-
lence. Judges decide applications for protection
orders, oversee men’s attendance to stopping vio-
lence programs, and decide on convictions against
perpetrators, among other things. Lawyers assist
women when applying for protection orders and
need to know which criteria must be included in the
affidavit. Under the current regulations, however,
there is no mandatory training on domestic violence
for judges or lawyers. 
Recommendation:
Given the significant role they each play in
addressing violence against women, the government
should establish mechanisms for mandatory training
on domestic violence for both judges and lawyers.
Conclusion:
Benefits officers from Work and Income New
Zealand (WINZ), the government agency that pro-
vides financial assistance and employment services
throughout the country, receive a large number of
domestic violence disclosures annually. 
Recommendation:
Given the prevalence of domestic violence in
New Zealand, frontline WINZ staff should receive
refresher training on domestic violence issues and
should conduct mandatory screening of all clients. 
DATA COLLECTION
Conclusion:
Domestic observers and international bodies,
such as the CEDAW Committee, have observed that
there is insufficient data collected on domestic vio-
lence in New Zealand. The lack of complete and reli-
able data affects the implementation and evaluation
of effective domestic violence policies because such
policies are not based on comprehensive research.
For instance, there is no data available to assess the
effectiveness of men’s stopping violence programs. 
Recommendation:
The government should produce, collect and
disseminate data on domestic violence (including, for
example, research on the prevalence, causes and
consequences of violence against all groups of
women, enforcement of protection orders, effective-
ness of stopping violence programs, the number of
convictions for domestic violence incidents, evalua-
tion of best practices and culturally appropriate
approaches to domestic violence) in full coordination
with all relevant governmental and non-governmen-
tal agencies.
3. Problems with implementation
A. STOPPING VIOLENCE PROGRAMS
The government fails to adequately monitor the
effectiveness of stopping violence programs. Stop-
ping violence programs are a critical component of
any comprehensive strategy to eliminate violence
against women. They help men (and women) to deal
with domestic violence and its implications, and
despite being triggered by domestic violence inci-
dents, stopping violence services are intended to
help prevent more violence. Therefore, the govern-
ment should evaluate these programs to see how
they are working in practice, and determine what is
needed to improve them.
It is assumed that because men complete a stop-
ping violence program they are ready to live free
of violence. As one stopping violence program
acknowledged, men “graduate” from these programs
because they complete the number of required ses-
sions but there is no actual assessment as to whether,
and how, the program has helped the person deal
with violence.234 For Brian Gardner, the National Man-
ager of the Stopping Violence Services Network, “the
government should be asking the men and women
who use the services and are impacted by them
[about the programs’effectiveness], but they’re not.” 235
Andrew Treacher, a Men’s Program Coordinator in
Wellington, agreed: even though he requires men to
complete a behavior checklist at the beginning and
the end of the program, he complains about the lack
of funding “to measure success or conduct research
and [thus] design new programs.” 236
Public servants confirm these remarks. A domes-
tic violence advisor explained that they evaluate the
effectiveness of programs “basically by respondent’s
attendance of a program.” 237 Similarly, the Family
Violence Court Coordinator in Invercargill added, “a
lot of work needs to be done evaluating the effect of
those programs.” 238 Even the Principal Family Court
Judge, Peter Boshier, raised concerns about the lack
of evaluation:
There is inadequate research on the efficacy
of programs for violators of domestic violence
laws. Victim programs are more successful
than perpetrator programs. The perpetrator
programs are a start, but studies need to be
done to see their effect on individuals. If per-
petrators don’t go to the meetings, they are not
held accountable, and the Ministry of Justice
is not good at prosecuting breaches. Men do
not attend programs at a rate of about 30%,
but the prosecutors put such breaches at the
bottom of their priority list. Men who do not
attend court-mandated programs need to be
prosecuted so people know the courts mean
business.239
During the Leitner Center’s visit to the country, it
became clear that stopping violence programs play a
crucial role in the strategy to prevent and eliminate
violence against women. Yet it was also clear that
there is much to be done to improve these pro-
grams’ effectiveness. Hence, the government should
allocate sufficient resources to evaluate these stop-
ping violence programs and also to allow for follow-
up with the participants. 
B. PROBLEMS WITH PROTECTION ORDERS 
At the core of the DVA 1995 lie protection orders.
Protection orders aim to ensure the safety of victims
of violence by preventing violence from occurring in
the future. Therefore, when protection orders are not
granted or served on respondents in a prompt man-
ner, there is a failure to protect victims of domestic
violence as intended. Similarly, when respondents
who fail to observe protection orders are not sanc-
tioned, not only are women put in danger; the whole
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system that has been put in place to prevent and
eliminate domestic violence is undermined. We
observed different problems with protection orders,
including failure to serve protection orders, lack of
enforcement of protection orders, and little knowl-
edge on how to obtain protection orders.
Failure to serve protection orders
Failure to serve protection orders stands out as
one of the most common problems recounted to the
Leitner Center delegation. One person we met with
commented that “there are police stations that actu-
ally refuse to serve protection orders. There are seri-
ous attitudinal issues that must be changed on a gov-
ernment level and through police training. There is a
common misperception that it is easy to get a pro-
tection order with no evidence and deprive men of
their children.” 240 Likewise, police should always
serve protection orders as rapidly as possible. As
told by Judge Peter Boshier, “one woman was grant-
ed a protection order on a Friday, there were prob-
lems serving the protection order, and she was fatal-
ly stabbed on Monday.” 241 As observed by a men’s
programs worker, “late service can re-spark vio-
lence.” 242 In many instances, the man has already
cooled down, the incident of violence has past, and
so the late service takes them back to the emotional
state linked to the violence event, thus increasing the
risk to the woman. Quick service helps concentrate
the situation into a shorter period of time and allows
parties to move forward quicker.243
Failure to serve is particularly acute in rural and
isolated zones. One interviewee remarked that
“serving protection orders in the North can be tough
because perpetrators can hide out for months.” 244
Lack of Enforcement of Protection
Orders
Once a protection order is granted, women
should feel safer. In theory, protection orders should
keep a perpetrator away from the applicant. And,
should there be a breach, police are supposed to
respond promptly. In many cases, survivors of
domestic violence told us that police had responded
quickly and decisively. As a result, women did feel
safer. There are occasions, however, when the oppo-
site is true. If protection orders are not correctly
enforced, they may in fact endanger the person who
initially sought help from the legal system by
increasing the hostility without providing additional
protection.Some domestic violence workers remarked
that “women are scared to use protection orders,
because enforcement is not good, thus putting them
in more danger.” 245 In December 2006, for instance,
Reipae, a 19-year old woman, was stabbed by her ex-
partner after police bailed the perpetrator to her
address at 4 a.m.246 He had been held by the police
for fighting in the street. The police bailed him to
Reipae’s address, notwithstanding the fact that she
had a protection order against him which included a
provision that said he was not allowed on her prop-
erty.247 Reipae phoned the police during her ex-part-
ner’s fatal attack on her with a knife. She was dead
before they arrived, only three hours after her ex-
partner had been released from custody. “The perpe-
trator killed her, had a drink of water, and went and
hanged himself.” 248 A domestic violence worker com-
mented: “bailing to the address of a victim is very
common.” 249
Breaches of protection orders amount to a large
number of the stories collected in the 2007 study
Living at the Cutting Edge, commissioned by the
Ministry of Justice.250 The Leitner Center delegation
encountered several women whose stories mirror
the ones contained in the aforementioned report.
One paradigmatic case in the report is Marama’s:
after several episodes of both psychological and
physical abuse, she had a protection order against
her partner, Patrick. Despite the protection order, on
many occasions Marama’s partner would break in at
her house leaving calling cards, putting mucus on the
window screen of her car, or flatting the bike’s tires
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to let her know that he still had access to her and her
daughters. On one occasion, Marama called the
police but, as she explains, they “didn’t seem both-
ered.” 251 “On another occasion, Patrick actually called
out to Marama. She called the police, and they told
her that it could be anyone.” 252 After another incident,
she called the police and they “suggested that Mara-
ma should hide out in her garden and take photos of
Patrick [damaging her property]. When she raised
the issue of her safety, they told her to “fit out a secu-
rity light.” 253 The report is filled with stories of breach-
es of protection orders. Similarly, a public health
scholar argues that the government agencies’ failure
to enforce protection orders ultimately led the gov-
ernment to adopt a whole new policy on enforce-
ment: Te Rito Action 3 “to establish and implement
processes for ensuring that the legal sanctions under
the Domestic Violence Act 1995 are effectively mon-
itored and enforced.” 254 Yet, this policy “appears
never to have been actioned.” 255
Lack of enforcement of protection orders touch-
es on police and judge training. As Chief Judge Peter
Boshier remarked: “enforcement of protection orders
is a grey area. Many cops are young, 20-22 years old,
and show up to a scene where the people involved
are all older than them, and there may be alcohol
involved and a lot of moving people. The cops may
not know who to believe, and in the exercise of their
discretion, may not be conservative enough.” 256
Judges also play a role in making sure protec-
tion orders are enforced. Shelley Gray, an attorney in
Invercargill with vast experience on family law and
protection order applications, observed that judges
are generally not strict with individuals who breach
protection orders. “People who breach protection
orders are not given high sentences,” she remarked.257
This can cause a man to resent a woman, potential-
ly leading to more violence. In addition, as explained
in the previous section, whenever a respondent fails
to attend a stopping violence program a judge may
summon him before the court.258 This is a discre-
tionary power that judges have and it should be uti-
lized. Otherwise, women may be at even higher risk
than when the violence began. The United Nations’
treaty bodies have also been critical of judges in this
area. In 2007, the CEDAW Committee declared its
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If protection orders are not correctly enforced, 
they may in fact endanger the person who initially
sought help from the legal system by increasing 
the hostility without providing additional protection.
Some domestic violence workers remarked that
“women are scared to use protection orders, 
because enforcement is not good, thus putting them
in more danger.”
concern “about the continued prevalence of violence
against women, particularly Ma¯ori, Pacific and minor-
ity women, and the low rates of prosecution and con-
victions for crimes of violence against women.” 259
One reason for poor enforcement of protection
orders is that Criminal Courts deal with breaches of
those orders, rather than Family Violence Courts,
which have granted the protection orders. A domes-
tic violence worker explained that the breach itself
may appear quite minor, especially for a criminal
court judge who is used to seeing different types of
criminal cases.
If the woman goes ahead and prosecutes that
breach, and the judge ends up spending most
of his or her day dealing with what would
appear to be a far less serious matter than
other things, judges might think, “This is not a
big deal. It’s not serious.” You’re often dealing
with criminal court judges that don’t have an
understanding of family violence. The victim
will go through the whole process only to
have the judge tell the perpetrator that he has
to go through a domestic violence program,
which in fact was already mandated by the
protection order in the first place. Why, then,
as a victim, would you drag yourself through
the whole process? 260
Stopping violence programs’ workers can also help
to enforce protection orders. It is critical that service
providers, who develop relationships with men who
attend these programs, be attentive to any type of
non-observance. If they act promptly, grave incidents
may in fact be prevented from occurring. But even if
service providers act quickly, it is paramount that
the courts respond. If judges fail to use their power
to check whether or not a respondent is in fact attend-
ing the program, incidents may happen. A stopping
violence program’s worker narrated an incident “in
2006, [where] two women were murdered. . . I had
done the paperwork on these men for not showing
up [to stopping violence programs] and nothing was
done.” 261 His critique is directed to the court system. 
Lack of education about 
protection orders’ availability and 
application process
Despite the increasing public awareness of
domestic violence in New Zealand, many people feel
that the application process to obtain a protection
order is still very complicated and largely unknown
to the public. A domestic violence advisor, for
instance, said that “with the knowledge that I have it
is still difficult [to prepare an application for a protec-
tion order].” 262 This advisor further remarked that
there is “a huge gap in people’s awareness [of avail-
ability of protection orders].” 263 It is important that
victims of violence have easy access to protection
orders since protection orders trigger a number of
services and legal protections, most prominently,
stopping violence services. 
As Robert Loo, Family Court Coordinator in
Invercargill and Chairman of the Family Violence
Focus Group, pointed out: “the biggest issue is
accessing services if you don’t have a protection
order; the government only funds for those who
have protection orders and that is a small part of the
women who could use services but they have no
way to access them.” 264 This makes access and avail-
ability of protection orders significantly important for
New Zealand’s domestic violence strategy.
Providing information to the community on the
application process for protection orders is also crit-
ical due to the absence of legal aid services in many
instances—whether it is due to geographic isolation,
lack of lawyers willing to take legal aid cases, or to
the fact that women may simply not qualify for legal
aid.265
Further, education on the availability of protec-
tion orders should be directed also to government
workers. As one service provider pointed out, “work-
ers often have a small amount of experience with
protection orders. . . The government should fund
community trainings and provide funding for training
social workers. Every government worker within
CYFS, all NGOs, the Trust’s health board, all of these
should be trained. We get wha¯nau who know a little
about protection orders but don’t know how to
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access the process because they are prevented by
prohibitive costs [of hiring a lawyer].” 266
C. MEETING THE STANDARDS OF THE 
DVA 1995 
Emotional abuse
Section 3 of the DVA 1995 includes psychologi-
cal abuse within the definition of domestic vio-
lence.267 However, in practice, it is difficult to obtain
legal protection whenever violence is psychological,
as opposed to physical. Family lawyers see that
judges are eager to grant protection orders for phys-
ical abuse, but they are reluctant when it comes to
psychological violence. Shelley Gray, a senior family
lawyer in Invercargill noted: “[t]he problem is judges
tend to grant protection orders mostly when there’s
physical violence; if there’s no physical violence,
they may just not issue a protection order.” 268 She
added that “‘zero tolerance’ is just words.” Similarly,
Anthony Mahon, a solicitor in Auckland, commented:
“emotional claims are much harder. . . to describe.” 269
A service provider in Wellington observed that
“people don’t understand that domestic violence
includes emotional and psychological violence. It is
rare to have a POL-400 [police form] for incidents of
emotional and psychological violence. Even CYF has
said, ‘it’s only verbal,’ even if [the violence] is recurring
and there are children involved.” 270 The service
provider commented that the public education cam-
paign—“It’s not OK”—did not raise awareness enough
about emotional and psychological violence.271 A sur-
vivor of domestic violence who currently serves as a
volunteer, commented: “Initially, after the DVA was
enacted, it was not [hard to obtain protection orders
for emotional abuse], due to the push for strong imple-
mentation of the Act. However, it has now become
harder; lawyers tend to put off survivors who come to
them with emotional abusive cases, because their
chances of getting protection orders are slim.” 272
Judge Boshier held a different perspective.
According to him, “most lawyers don’t volunteer this
information [for example, copies of text messages
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and emails as evidence of such abuse], and so there
is an issue of evidence.” 273 He believes most family
court judges share the view that emotional abuse
constitutes family violence.274
At times, police also fail to deal with situations
where abuse is not physical. The Services Manager
of Preventing Violence in the Home, an organization
which provides training to police, remarked that
“police should take into account the risk to the vic-
tim and the victim’s perception of risk. But the police
are not adequately trained to assess risk. There are
technical breaches of the protection orders that they
don’t arrest for unless it’s a physical assault.” 275Anoth-
er survivor of domestic violence who volunteers at a
service provider, said they get worried when they
have a client who has been through emotional
abuse, because “we just know it won’t get through.” 276
Immigrant women and disabled women
New Zealand’s law and regulations on domestic
violence are directed to all individuals. However,
two disadvantaged groups are often left in the mar-
gins of the DVA 1995 and its implementing regula-
tions—immigrants and women with disabilities.
Immigrant women often come from cultures
where there is no reporting and no law on domestic
violence, where violence is “part of life for the
woman.” 277 For many migrant women, residency sta-
tus is used by abusive partners as a tool of power
and control. According to Shila Nair of Shakti Asian
Women’s Centre: “Often in these cases, women find
they can’t go home because they are no longer a part
of her family in her home country, and there is a stig-
ma of those who leave marriages. Therefore, women
find it hard to find a place to stay.” 278 Holly Carring-
ton, from Preventing Violence in the Home, further
noted: “when [migrant women] do leave the man
and seek help, they report feeling alienated by the
environment of the court, eventually making them
return to the household.” 279
Shakti workers commented that women find
that “judges have hardly any cultural understanding;
and even though they want to implement New
Zealand law, they need to understand cultural back-
grounds.” 280 Shila Nair highlighted, though, one major
case in 2007 where Judge David Mather, from the
Waitakere Family Violence Court, recognized dowry
as psychological abuse. “It was a major milestone for
this kind of cultural understanding.” 281
There is disagreement on whether police with
the same cultural background should be called to the
scene of a domestic violence incident. In Christ-
church, for instance, workers at Shakti have a good
relationship with a Chinese woman police officer,
“who is able to serve as translator for Chinese
women who report domestic violence.” 282 In Auck-
land, however, Shakti workers think differently: 
there are instances where police will send a
policeman with the same ethnic background
as the victim thinking they are being cultural-
ly appropriate, and it is actually bad for the
victim because the police from the same cul-
ture will think the abuse is okay and not rec-
ognize the act as domestic violence.283
Generally, migrant women tend to report domestic
violence less than Ma¯ori and Pakeha women. As a
consequence, the government’s notable public cam-
paigns efforts should be especially sensitive to
migrant women. However, this is not the case.
According to Shila Nair, “’It’s not OK!’ is not working
for immigrants—the general sentiment is that it is
propaganda that is not meant for us, it is for Whites
and Ma¯ori.” 284 Indeed, when the Leitner Center dele-
gation met with staff from the Campaign for Action
on family Violence, we raised the question about the
absence of immigrant faces on the TV ads. Staff
members were aware about “increasing the stigma
attached to already stigmatized groups.” 285 Yet they
noted that there were no immigrant faces on the ads
due to time constraints: “We only have 40 seconds
to send the message out.” 286 Since migrant women
are particularly invisible to domestic violence strate-
gies—due to language and cultural barriers—using
part of those 40 seconds to portray ethnic migrant
communities should be a priority.
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Women with disabilities also face greater chal-
lenges when they are victims of domestic violence.
According to Lorri Mackness, Disability Project Coor-
dinator of the National Network of Stopping Violence
Services, disabled women are 2 to 22 times more
likely (depending on the study) to be abused.287
During the DVA 1995 review process that the
Ministry of Justice conducted at the beginning of
2008, the Disability Coalition Against Violence filed
a submission in which it stated that “just as Pakeha
cannot know or tell Ma¯ori what they need, non-dis-
abled cannot know or tell disabled what they need.” 288
The Coalition raised as problematic the “lack of
access to refuges and safe places for many people
with disabilities” and “the lack of trained pool of
domestic violence carers on call to support disabled
victims, who cannot get into refuge and cannot be
left on their own when the police remove the abus-
er.” 289 Like migrant women, women with disabilities
often refrain from reporting abuse and violence. Lau-
rie McNess commented: “There was one instance
where one of my clients came forward with sexual
abuse claims, and a week later six of her friends did
as well. Over the next two months, 70 more people
had stories of sexual abuse by workers in the facili-
ty, but they had to walk away because there wasn’t
enough staff to deal with it—it would create chaos in
the management.” 290
Conclusions and Recommendations
STOPPING VIOLENCE PROGRAMS
Conclusion:
Stopping violence programs play a crucial role in
New Zealand’s strategy to prevent and eliminate
domestic violence yet the government currently does
not have a uniform approach to evaluate the efficacy
of such programs.
Recommendation:
To better comply with its international obligation
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to act with due diligence to prevent acts of domestic
violence, the government should allocate resources
to evaluate stopping violence programs with a view
to improve the efficacy of these programs.
PROTECTION ORDERS
Conclusion:
Protection orders lie at the core of the current
legislation on domestic violence (the DVA 1995 and
its Regulations). Therefore, it is crucial that protection
orders be served promptly. In some instances, police
refuse to serve protection orders; on other occasions,
they fail to do so, thus putting women in more risk.
Recommendation: 
In order to comply with its obligations to act with
due diligence to prevent acts of violence, the govern-
ment should ensure that police promptly serve pro-
tection orders in all cases and by all possible means.
Conclusion:
Once a protection order is granted it remains in
place unless a judge dismisses it. Police officers and
judges should therefore consider breaches of protec-
tion orders serious in all cases. In some instances,
however, members of the police or judiciary have
deemed breaches of protection orders to be minor or
of little importance. 
Recommendation:
The government should make efforts to make
sure that protection orders are fully enforced and that
all breaches are addressed promptly and decisively.
Conclusion:
Criminal courts oversee breaches of protection
orders. On occasions, this causes a lack of coordina-
tion with Family Violence Courts, which grant pro-
tection orders. Further, Criminal Court judges, who
are used to dealing with serious crimes, may under-
estimate incidents that constitute breaches of protec-
tion orders. 
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Recommendation:
The government should consider giving jurisdic-
tion to Family Violence Courts to address breaches
of protection orders.
Conclusion:
Victims of domestic violence must have easy
access to protection orders. In many cases, victims
do not know enough about available services and
the process to obtain protection orders. 
Recommendation:
Because protection orders trigger a number of
services for both victims and perpetrators, the gov-
ernment should make efforts to make information
on protection orders easily available, particularly in
isolated and rural zones.
EMOTIONAL ABUSE
Conclusion:
Under Section 3 of the DVA 1995, emotional
abuse is treated as seriously as physical abuse. In
practice, however, there is little enforcement of these
provisions. Because emotional abuse is hard to
prove, judges may be less eager to grant protection
orders on grounds of emotional abuse alone. Police
may also be unwilling to arrest for breach of a pro-
tection order that does not involve physical assault.
As a result, many incidents of actual violence are not
properly addressed, thus undermining the govern-
ment’s effort to eliminate violence against women.
Recommendation:
The government should carry out adequate
training on emotional abuse for police, judges,
lawyers and government workers to ensure that
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emotional abuse is treated as seriously as physical
abuse when it comes to granting and enforcing orders
of protection.
IMMIGRANT WOMEN
Conclusion:
Under the current legislation and regulations,
migrant persons are subject to the law’s protection.
In practice, however, migrant women report domes-
tic violence less and remain invisible to many of the
protections due to cultural and language barriers. 
Recommendation:
In order to better protect migrant women from
acts of domestic violence and to investigate and pun-
ish such acts against migrant women, the govern-
ment should conduct training for judges and police
on how to deal with domestic violence within immi-
grant communities.
DISABLED WOMEN
Conclusion:
Women with disabilities face particular chal-
lenges when they are victims of domestic violence.
They are more likely to face abuse and less likely to
report abuse or violence due to lack of access to
refuges and safe places because of their disabilities
and an inability to care for themselves when left
alone if the police remove the abuser.
Recommendation:
The government should consider making refuges
more accessible for women with disabilities and pro-
viding trained persons to support disabled victims in
their home where necessary.
The government should carry out adequate training
on emotional abuse for police, judges, lawyers and
government workers to ensure that emotional abuse
is treated as seriously as physical abuse when it
comes to granting and enforcing orders of protection.
implementation also pertain to the Ma¯ori communi-
ties and impede progress on eliminating family vio-
lence in these communities. Indeed, some of the
cases discussed above to illustrate these identified
problems involve Ma¯ori communities.292 In addition
to these general problems, there are issues specific
to the Ma¯ori communities that lead to increased rates
of violence and that require culturally appropriate
responses and Ma¯ori-specific programs to address
domestic violence.
This part first briefly considers the composition
of the population of New Zealand and identifies dis-
parities between different segments of the popula-
tion. It then considers some of the reasons offered to
explain these disparities. This section provides some
context for the discussion regarding domestic vio-
lence in Ma¯ori communities that follows. Without
such context, “[t]here is a risk of reductionism, which
reduces family violence to an intimate relationship
removed from any social context.” 293 This section
then highlights some of the difficulties facing Ma¯ori
communities in addressing domestic violence.
1. Socioeconomic indicators and 
disparities in New Zealand
Although estimates vary somewhat, approximately
four and one quarter million people live in New
Zealand.294 People of European descent or Pakeha
comprise the largest ethnic group, at nearly three
million people (approximately 78%).295 The second
largest ethnic group is the Ma¯ori, who make up
about 15% of the population, or approximately .57
million people.296 Asians comprise about 9% of the
population, and Pacific peoples are about 7% of the
population.297 New Zealanders have a fairly high life
expectancy and, to the extent that life expectancy is
a proxy for overall health, they are a fairly healthy
people. But health is not evenly distributed. Overall
life expectancy at birth for the three year period end-
ing in 2006 was 81.9 years for females and 77.9
years for males.298 Life expectancy for Ma¯ori women,
however, was 73.2 years and for Ma¯ori men 69.0
years.299
There are similar disparities in earnings, unem-
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III: Domestic Violence in Ma¯ori Communities
The rates of family violence in Ma¯ori communities in New Zealand are even higher
than the rates for the general population discussed above. According to the Ministry
of Social Development’s 2008 Social Report, Ma¯ori women are three times more at
risk of being assaulted or threatened by a partner than the average (18 percent
compared with 6 percent for all respondents).291 The problems discussed above
with respect to the current domestic violence legislation and regulations and their
ployment and education. Median hourly earnings in
June 2006 were NZ$ 17.00 per hour. 300 Disaggregat-
ed by ethnicity, Europeans were the only group with
a median income higher than the total median (NZ$
17.74 per hour, compared to Ma¯ori (NZ$ 15.15 per
hour), Pacific peoples (NZ$ 14.50 per hour), and
Others (NZ$ 15.56 per hour)).301 Unemployment, rel-
atively low in New Zealand, has “declined steadily
since 1998.” 302 However, the rates for Ma¯ori (7.9%),
Pacific people (6.4%), and Others (including many
recent migrants) (6.2%) were much higher in 2006
than the overall rate (3.8%) and European rate
(2.7%).303 With respect to educational attainment, in
the year ended December 2006, 77% of the popula-
tion aged 25-64 had attained an educational qualifi-
cation at upper secondary or above, and almost 20%
of people had a bachelor’s degree or higher.304 The
rates of people with at least upper secondary level
qualifications is lower for Ma¯ori (60.7%) and Pacific
peoples (53.5%) than Europeans (80.1%), however.305
Similarly, the rates of people with tertiary qualifica-
tions were 18.9% for Europeans, 6.5% for the Ma¯ori,
and 7.1% for Pacific peoples.306
Compared to some countries New Zealand has
a relatively low homicide rate.307 All of its citizens are
not equally safe from crime, nor equally involved in
the penal system, however. In 2004, the number of
people who “died as a result of assault or intentional
injury” was 1.2 per 100,000 people, with males more
like to die from assault or intentional injury than
females (1.7 and .7 per 100,000, respectively).308 Dis-
aggregated into a binary Ma¯ori/Non-Ma¯ori variable,
the Ma¯ori rate (2.9 per 100,000) is more than dou-
ble the overall rate, and more than triple the non-
Ma¯ori rate (.8 per 100,000).309 The rate for Ma¯ori males
(4.7 per 100,000) is nearly triple the overall rate for
males, while the rate for females (1.2 per 100,000) is
almost double the overall rate.310 Ma¯ori and Pacific
peoples are also more likely to be the victims of a
crime than Asians or Europeans. According to the
New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey 2006, “39
percent of New Zealand adults aged 15years and over
experienced some form of criminal victimi[z]ation in
2005.” 311 For Ma¯ori and Pacific peoples, however: “47
percent of [Ma¯ori and Pacific] adults had experienced
some form of criminal Victimi[z]ation in 2005.” 312
Perhaps most relevant for the current report,
“[f]or Ma¯ori women, the risk of being assaulted or
threatened by a partner is three times the average
(18 percent compared with 6 percent for all respon-
dents).” 313 As noted by one Ma¯ori leader, “family vio-
lence is the most significant issue confronting our
people.” 314 “I told the Minister of Social Development
that family violence was the most significant issue
facing the community and if we did not find a way
to stop it, it would destroy our communities.” 315 On
the opposite side of the criminal justice system,
Ma¯ori and Pacific peoples have much higher incar-
ceration rates (440 and 220 per 100,000, respective-
ly) than the overall population (130 per 100,000), the
collective Non-Ma¯ori rate (80 per 100,000), or the
rate for the European ethnic group (70 per 100,000).316
2. Explanations for the disparities 
Although disparities for segments of the New Zealand
population on a variety of indicators are fairly well
established, the causes for those disparities are far
less settled, and proffered solutions to the problems
they present vary greatly. Suggested causes for
disparities between Ma¯ori and others range from a
historical legacy of colonialism and discrimination to
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a range of analyses from a “culture of poverty,” “cul-
ture of violence,” to a “warrior gene.” 317 According to
some Ma¯ori service providers we interviewed,
Ma¯ori communities exist in a context of disempow-
erment, which engenders family violence. “[Colonial
history] doesn’t become an excuse [but it] creates a
context in which certain choices become more
viable.” 318 One interviewee noted that warrior myth
is the pop explanation for domestic violence in
Ma¯ori communities. In the absence of other more
positive, externally-generated images of Ma¯ori, it has
become internalized by Ma¯ori.319 “Not a lot of
attempts [have been made] to separate out a history
of warfare [from] violence between intimate part-
ners.” 320 Contrary to this image, early ethnographers
criticized Ma¯ori for “not disciplining children and
[for] their women being too uppity…and having a
voice.” 321 An academic we met with also pointed to
colonization as one of the factors leading to domes-
tic violence in Ma¯ori communities:
I think a lot of it is rooted in post-colonization
issues . . . There was colonization and between
1840-1899 Ma¯ori lost a lot of land and com-
mercial opportunities, so there was a socioe-
conomic collapse and poverty. Then diseases
and various wars, and the population col-
lapsed numerically. Then we went through a
period of assimilation. Then with post-World
War II urbanization, another push of assimila-
tion. Also the deliberate introduction of alco-
hol. . . So there started to be set up multiple
generations of dysfunction. The term “multi-
generational stress disorder” is used to
describe countries where there has been col-
onization and indigenous peoples are now a
minority in their homeland.322
Socio-economic factors have also been pointed to as
a cause of domestic violence in Ma¯ori communities.
For his part, then Minister of Justice Mark Burton
(2003) acknowledged that the “root causes of Ma¯ori
over-representation in the criminal justice system
appear to be cent[e]red on socio-economic factors
rather than ethnicity. Being Ma¯ori does not make a
person an offender. . . . Pacific peoples’ over-represen-
tation in the criminal justice system. . . seems to be
cent[e]red on similar socio-economic risk factors.” 323
A Ma¯ori provider similarly noted that: “The single
most persistent factor shared among domestic vio-
lence cases is socioeconomic. If you control for
socioeconomic indicators then our (Ma¯ori) dispro-
portionality disappears.” 324
According to Robert Cooper, CEO of Ngati Hine
Health Trust, violence in New Zealand is “horizontal,
structural, and political.” 325 Government legislation is
causing “unbearable pressure on ordinary family
relationships [when] they’re tough enough. There is
insufficient income to meet fundamental needs, chil-
dren’s nutrition is inadequate.” 326 Many Ma¯ori youth
take up drugs, gangs, and violence because they offer
a logical “escape from brutal realities” of their lives.
Ma¯ori have “enough natural intelligence to forecast
their future. Their prospects as older people aren’t
good.” 327 Of course, there are “some people with indi-
vidual capacity who will shine in anything that they
do and have the opportunity to follow careers [but]
there are others for whom that is a forlorn hope.” 328
There are many more in the latter camp who are
“overwhelmed, poorly educated, under-employed,
underpaid, and culturally alienated. Within our fami-
lies there are those among us who are not benefiting
from New Zealand’s economic and social develop-
ment.” 329
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On a recent trip to New Zealand, the former
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people
“received plenty of evidence concerning the histori-
cal and institutional discrimination suffered by the
Ma¯ori people.” 330 According to the former Special
Rapporteur, “[h]istorically, much legislation [has] had
a negative impact on Ma¯ori rights.” 331 The historical
discrimination seems largely to have been related to
land rights and culture. 
With respect to land, the former Special Rappor-
teur notes that “approximately. . . 94 per cent of Ma¯ori
ancestral land base has been appropriated by a vari-
ety of historical processes, including. . . fraudulent
purchase, confiscation or alienations of land under
the various Native Land Acts, and the individualiza-
tion and fragmentation of title resulting from the
Native Land Court.” 332 One specific example of this
is that in the 1860s the Crown used military action
to confiscate over 2 million acres from the people of
Taranaki (over 96% of their original lands) while per-
secuting those who resisted, and then sold or leased
the land to non-Ma¯ori into the twentieth century.333
In contemporary times, Treaty settlements intended
to redress this historical discrimination have
“involve[d] quantities of reparation that represent
merely a fraction of the value of the land and
resources lost by Ma¯ori during the colonial peri-
od,” 334 arguably compounding prior discrimination
and constituting a continuing form of discrimination
against the Ma¯ori. It is perceived as such by some
Ma¯ori legal authorities, particularly because “claimants
[are forced] to waive their entitlement to the protec-
tion of the courts when they negotiate settlements. . .
until the claimants have waived their rights, the
negotiations will not be finalized,” and the result is
therefore perceived as “a largely imposed settlement
package, which claimants cannot bring before an
independent or judicial body for rigorous qualitative
testing.” 335 And of course, the biggest recent land
rights issue has been the Foreshore and Seabed con-
troversy.336
With respect to cultural discrimination, the for-
mer Special Rapporteur points out that, historically,
cultural and educational policy was based on a
model of Ma¯ori assimilation,337 which undermined
Ma¯ori cultural identity and governance structures.338
Use of the Ma¯ori language in schools was actively
discouraged,339 for example. These policies did not
recognize the “inherent rights” of the Ma¯ori, nor their
“traditional governance bodies.” 340 According to one
Ma¯ori provider we met with, “institutionalized
racism is still present, though it’s not like it was 20
years ago. Now Ma¯ori are driven to be ‘Ma¯ori for
Ma¯ori.’ Twenty years ago, an organization like [this
one] wouldn’t have existed because separatist strate-
gies were scorned. Views are more accepting now to
let Ma¯ori choose for themselves. Before, there was
also no trust of Ma¯ori with funds for programs and
there were doubts about Ma¯ori’s skills to administer
programs. . . sense that you can be too brown.” 341
A final area highlighted by the former Special
Rapporteur has to do with depiction of Ma¯ori in the
media, where stereotypical and negative images
seem to dominate.342 A 2004 study showed that
Ma¯ori are portrayed as possessing benefits denied to
others, and as being corrupt or financially incompe-
tent managers.343 The former Special Rapporteur con-
sidered the study’s findings to be of “special con-
cern,” and that they “highlight a systematic negative
description of Ma¯ori in media coverage” warranting
attention via the New Zealand Human Rights Act.344
We heard similar critiques from people we met with
in New Zealand. As stated by one Ma¯ori provider: “If
you ask any New Zealander to name three children
who have been killed they’ll name three Ma¯ori. But
Ma¯ori children are not the only ones [who have
been the victims of family violence murders].” 345 An
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academic similarly noted that if you take six cases,
three are well known Ma¯ori cases, and three are
non-Ma¯ori cases no one has ever heard of, where
the facts are substantially the same.346 “Discrimina-
tion in how Ma¯ori are depicted feeds the stereotype
that all Ma¯ori men are violent and abuse their wife
and children, which is extremely unhealthy.” 347 A
Ma¯ori leader also noted that the media spotlights
problems in non-Pakeha communities. “The selection
of news items pertaining to Ma¯ori and immigrant
communities is illustrative of a racist attitude. . . What
[the media] does to people is tell them they can’t
work their way out of the situation they’re in. The
media tells them they’re poor, dumb, and don’t con-
tribute to the economy and there is nothing of the
accomplishments of Ma¯ori and Pacific communi-
ties. . . . ” 348
3. Funding Issues
A number of individuals expressed concerns related
to government funding of Ma¯ori service providers.
In particular, individuals noted difficulties due to
insufficient funding of programs, government fund-
ing unnecessary new strategies or programs rather
than sustaining existing programs and government
policy against funding needed capital expenditures.
Although we focus on Ma¯ori service providers here
because our research in this area was gathered pri-
marily from Ma¯ori providers, we recognize that
many of the difficulties with respect to funding
would apply to non-Ma¯ori providers as well.
The government has a policy to “never give out
the whole funding amount” required for a program.349
This causes great difficulties for service providers
who must provide 100% of needed services without
receiving funding to cover the costs of such services
and with little time or ability to fundraise to make up
the difference. According to a member of Parliament,
the government often outsources its work without
providing total funding.350 The “social services have
become little fingers of the state,” but they are delib-
erately underfunded.351 NGOs have to be account-
able, but because they are underfunded, they have to
pay staff less. The member of Parliament gave, as
an example, a group of 200 Ma¯ori social service
providers that must comply with state regulations,
but pays 20% less than market for salaries because
of insufficient funding.352 Moreoever, a Ma¯ori service
provider pointed out that “the government funds
itself to screen and make referrals but refers people
to NGOs /service providers that are under-funded.” 353
One Ma¯ori service provider explained that they
are funded to provide domestic violence services by
Child, Youth and Family (CYF), a service of the Min-
istry of Social Development.354 The funding they
receive, however, only covers the cost of such serv-
ices for the first two quarters of the year. This
provider also noted that they service a broad geo-
graphical area.355 It takes “time and money to reach
isolated communities and people in need of [their]
services.” Yet they receive no funding for education,
outreach or for gas for transportation.356 Moreover,
“the government agencies will continue to refer
clients even though they know we’re not funded to
provide that service.” 357 Another Ma¯ori provider sim-
ilarly noted that they are only funded for a certain
number of families in a year but that they “work with
that [number of families] in a week.” 358
One service provider we met with in the South
Island receives half of its funding from the govern-
ment, and raises the rest of its funding from “trusts,
lotteries, wherever we can.” 359 This provider is “only
covered for the first initial contact of a number of
clients per year.” 360 As a result, they spend “quite a
lot” of time chasing money.361 Another provider in the
South Island noted that the funding they receive “is
stringent” and that they “have to do a lot of actively
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seeking funds.” 362 This provider “fulfill[s] our contract
number of people that we’re supposed to see in the
first four months of the year.” This organization may
be “fully funded” by the government as a result of a
new policy, Pathway to Partnership, discussed below.
The additional funding they may receive will not
cover the cost of having someone do all the paper-
work that will be required, however.363 It will cover
“existing contracts, probably. Not salaries or wages. It
will cover outreach, residential services, the phone
line, but not the people to answer the phone or the
phone bill. Only enough for day-to-day operations,
not training.” 364 The organization expressed concern
about people hearing that they are to be fully funded
now, which could make it harder for them to raise
money they need to cover operating costs.365
Another problem identified with respect to fund-
ing was a pattern where the government will fund an
initiative in the beginning but will not provide fund-
ing to sustain the program. A Ma¯ori leader noted that
good projects are often put in place but then funding
is withdrawn or cutback.366 For example, Mauri Ora
was a project that was working but funding almost
cut until they convinced the Ministry of Ma¯ori
Affairs to adopt the project.367 The project was saved
but it is still under-resourced. According to the Ma¯ori
leader, “[t]hey don’t resource it to the level it needs to
be” which is “appalling because they do go through
an exceptional process” in terms of getting certi-
fied.368 “Even if they basically jump through all the
government’s hoops they still don’t get the required
funding to do their jobs.” 369 A domestic violence
expert we interviewed similarly noted that it is “a
trait of that part of government,” the Ministry of
Social Development, “they have a little bit of money
so they support something at the start and hope oth-
ers will take up the funding later.” 370 According to a
domestic violence counselor, “What I’ve seen is that
the Ma¯ori services come and go and that there are
many cases where Ma¯ori groups that are successful
have funding that is not renewed. Or mainstream
organizations copy the model and then the Ma¯ori
service funding is pulled.” 371
A number of people also expressed frustration
with the government practice of funding new studies
and initiatives to address domestic violence rather
than adequately funding existing organizations that
are working on this issue. One person described the
government approach as: “Bang! Here’s a new cam-
paign. Community: Define. Deliver. Here’s $40,000.
But there is no follow up.” 372 Knowledge is lost with
each new round of task forces, reports, and guide-
lines.373 As noted by Ruth Herbert: “There have been
strategies for Ma¯ori over and over but there has not
been a big impact. Some of the policies were good
but when they are not implemented they are lost and
new policies are thought up. Why? There is a lack of
resources, will and continuity. We keep rearranging
the deck chairs on the ship.” 374 Others noted the
challenges for the Family Violence Taskforce in
developing a shared analysis of violence in a big
group with varying levels of knowledge and experi-
ence in working with domestic violence. They also
commented on the difficulty of retaining suitably
experienced policy, research and operational sup-
port.375 Ruth Herbert also pointed out that “[i]n New
Zealand we forget to look at other countries and how
they have done things so we are always inventing
new processes. . .  New Zealand won’t look at other
models. New Zealand wants to reinvent the wheel
and try something new.” 376
One service provider suggested that “the gov-
ernment must also actually give money to existing
networks and agencies rather than keep spending
money on new strategies. . . . The government’s
approaches are too short term. We need money to
sustain the capacity that has been built. Many posi-
tions are under-resourced. After money is spent on
training, etc, there is very little left over for individual
clients.” 377 This provider also noted “[b]y the time the
money has dripped down, [it ends up providing] $20
per client.” 378 Another service provider similarly
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noted of new strategies and task forces “they have
these meetings. They get paid $200 a day or some-
thing ridiculous. They make these beautiful policies,
it comes back into our community, by the time it gets
here there’s nothing.” 379
A final problem noted with respect to funding is
that “most contracts don’t allow for capital expendi-
tures.” 380 Because of funding restrictions, service
providers may not use government funds for build-
ings, telephone lines, or other capital expenditures.381
In one instance, an organization’s request for govern-
ment funding to install a phone system was rejected.
Yet the same organization was later “criticized for not
being responsive [by phone],” which was the very
problem they were attempting to alleviate with addi-
tional phone lines.382
The New Zealand government has announced a
new funding plan, Pathway to Partnership, which may
help address some of the problems identified above.
According to the Ministry of Social Development,
“Pathway to Partnership is a multi-year strategy
aimed at strengthening community-based family,
child and youth focused services.” 383 Pursuant to this
plan, the Government is increasing its investment in
these services by $446 million over the next four
years.384 The funding will be for existing services that
currently have a contract with a relevant govern-
ment agency. “The money is being progressively
introduced from 1 July 2008, with an extra $52 mil-
lion available in 2008/09. This is made up of the
$37.5 million announced in February 2008 as well as
$15 million already allocated as part of Pathway to
Partnership in the 2007 Budget. The funding increas-
es to $192.8 million in 2011/12.” 385 At the time of the
Leitner Center’s visit to New Zealand in May 2008,
we were informed by the Ministry of Social Devel-
opment that the plan was “being developed as we
speak” so we were not able to determine how the
new program would address the problems identified
above.386
4. Approval and Contracting for
Service Providers 
Under the DVA 1995 and its implementing regula-
tions, service providers must be approved in order to
receive government funding. The approval process
for service providers is set forth in the Domestic
Violence (Programmes) Regulations 1996 (as amend-
ed 2002). The system for approving domestic vio-
lence programs is both complicated and lengthy.
There are two parts to the approval process:
provider approval and program approval. Under the
Regulations, applicants are required to submit
detailed written submissions to panels that review
the applications.387 For organizations applying to be
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Another problem identified with respect to funding
was a pattern where the government will fund 
an initiative in the beginning but will not provide
funding to sustain the program. A Ma¯ori leader
noted that good projects are often put in place but
then funding is withdrawn or cutback.
an approved service provider, such applications
must include:
• the date the organisation was established
(regulation 20);
• the objectives and functions of the organisa-
tion (regulation 20);
• whether the organisation has, in the past,
provided programmes similar to those for
which the applicant seeks approval;
• the authorised persons (the facilitators): full
names and addresses; and a summary of
their knowledge, skills and expertise (regula-
tion 20).
• a system for ensuring that facilitators only
have authorisation to provide programmes
for the duration of the agency’s approval;
• a process to ensure that only facilitators who
continue to meet regulation 15 deliver pro-
grammes;
• a code of ethics or practice;
• an effective complaints procedure;
• a relevant level of continuing education and
an appropriate level of peer supervision or
peer review for facilitators;
• systems to ensure assessment and ongoing
review of the needs of attendees;
• provision for communication between the
facilitator and any other programme provider
who is providing a programme to any other
person who is protected by, or subject to, the
same protection order;
• safety provisions for every person attending
the programme;
• regular monitoring, evaluation of effective-
ness and presentation of programmes; and
• procedures to manage confidentiality, con-
sent and safety issues (section 43).388
There are additional application requirements then
for program approval.389 If an application is approved,
“the domestic violence advisor will arrange for the
regional contract manager to negotiate a contract for
the service. A contract is required before the Min-
istry of Justice can make referrals to the programme.
Approval of a programme does not guarantee a con-
tract with the Ministry of Justice although all
approved providers will be considered for a con-
tract.” 390
As a result of these government certification
requirements, “there has been a movement from an
activist /grassroots approach to a professionalization
of the response to domestic violence.” 391 Although
this may seem to be a positive development, “the bar
for professionalism keeps rising, making it hard for
providers to attain approval.” 392 According to one
provider, this has the “effect of specifically limiting
Ma¯ori providers because in some areas no one can
qualify. . . . [P]roviders that have already been doing
the work for years and have hands on experience
and skills but lack formal training are often unable to
get government approval or funding.” 393 Significantly,
“these are the people who best understand the com-
munity and its cultural dynamics.” 394 This raises the
question of “what do we mean by being qualified?” 395
If you create a set a criteria and the reality is that
there is no one in an area who can meet it, the result
is that no one can provide the needed service and
no money is authorized to fund what might be work-
ing.396 Ma¯ori focused and community delivered train-
ing such as training provided by Project Mauri Ora
and Amokura are intended to address these training
needs for rural Ma¯ori communities.
Panels are not required to meet with the organ-
izations applying for approval. Rather, the determina-
tion is made by the panel based on paper submis-
sions from the organization seeking certification. In
practice, the paper process is a barrier for many
Ma¯ori service providers.397 It means that organiza-
tions that know how to fill out a government appli-
cation with the correct language can get approved,
“even if they have no idea what they are doing.” 398 At
the same time, “for Ma¯ori service providers they
don’t have the capacity to fill out the application with
the correct bells and whistles.” 399 To illustrate this
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problem, one service provider shared that:
Well, currently there’s a group. . . it’s kaupapa-
Ma¯ori-driven. It’s a Ma¯ori program, Ma¯ori
models. They haven’t gone for approval
because they can’t jump through that hoop of
approval . . .because they don’t have some-
body with the skill and expertise to stick them
through the entire process of making applica-
tion, of how it looks like in a folder… As you
know, they’re saying “But we want you to do
this, this, and that” but who knows how to fill
out that paper work? You know you’ve got this
really good meaning marae-based organiza-
tion but nobody know how to do that. So it’s
just silly-what they need to do is start sending
their people who write that stuff out to the
communities, have them say, “This is how you
do it” give them a template, fill it out. Make it
easier.400
This situation led another Ma¯ori service provider
to note that oftentimes the “qualification needed to
provide a government-contracted service isn’t worth
the paper it’s written on” and that “the best people
working on domestic violence do it from their heart
not for the almighty dollar.” 401 Another person sug-
gested that organizations applying for funding should
be assessed based on experience rather than focus-
ing exclusively on paperwork. The panel should
“look at the structure of governance and who is
responsible for running and an organization’s opera-
tions and function. In particular, look at the govern-
ing board and ask what life skills do they bring to the
table? Obviously, they need to have some form of
official qualifications, but it’s also important that they
belong to the area and have experience.” 402
In some instances, organizations also have diffi-
culty in accessing the forms and applications to
apply for funding.
The push everywhere is to de-paper. Some
contracts are only available through an elec-
tronic tendering system. The effect on rural/
small organizations who lack access to tech-
nology is profound. For example, there are
some places that only have dial-up connec-
tions to the internet. The end result is that peo-
ple are being assessed on their ability to navi-
gate the forms rather than provide the needed
service. And while they might fail at register-
ing, they could have succeeded at the other.403
Even after certification, the paperwork and adminis-
trative requirements can be onerous. As noted by
one provider, “It’s a huge uphill battle to keep up with
it.” 404 According to a Ma¯ori service provider, “the
interesting thing about the government funding, what
they’ve actually done, they’re giving out these little
piecemeal amounts with these huge accountability
reports, it’s crazy, the huge amounts of hoops that we
have to jump through to retain and maintain that
funding is huge, and for a small amount of money.” 405
They went on to explain that the government want-
ed them to have “supervision, supervision reports,
and you can’t find a supervisor. . . . You can’t get
them. . . that’s a real problem. See, and there are lots
of more isolated communities than ours that have
struggled, really really struggled.” 406 Interestingly, this
Service Provider acknowledged that “there’s nothing
wrong with having one. . .  We’d love having a super-
visor” but “we can’t, we live in [a rural location]. It’s
a bit hard to access things like that . . .  [T]here are just
not enough trained people around. . . . Especially
trained around domestic violence, not enough.” 407
Some organizations have actually given up pro-
gram approval and government funding as a result
of the administrative requirements. One Ma¯ori
provider relinquished program approval for individ-
ual counseling programs, deciding not to go “through
all that paper work again to just do individuals
because it’s a small amount of money. . . too many
hoops- too many technical and legal hoops to jump
through, honestly the paper work is phenomenal.” 408
As a result, they now refer people in their area who
seek that type of program to the closest urban area.409
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5. Services in Rural areas 
Rural Ma¯ori communities have particular difficulties
in accessing services. “This region (the north) has
the unfortunate distinction of being the ‘top-of-the-
bottom.’ In other words, they rank near the top in all
social indicators you don’t want to rank highly in. The
communities are under-serviced and under-
resourced.” 410 In addition, “[a]s the price of petrol has
gone up recently, the difficulty of reaching rural pop-
ulations has become more severe; it is also com-
pounded by the geography and lack of infrastructure
in the North (dirt roads, rural communities).” 411 As
noted above, in some areas there are limited
providers because no one in the area can qualify for
certification or comply with the administrative
requirements to sustain funding.412
According to some, this problem of access to
services is exacerbated by the “no-go zones” policy
of the government.413 “No-go zones” are places where
unemployment benefits are not offered. “If you move
in [to a no-go zone] you are not eligible for govern-
ment benefits because you’ve moved away from
jobs.” 414 This policy is “completely encouraging
urbanization.” 415 It also depletes the rural area of
older people who can contribute to the community
but need to receive benefits.416 “If you’re not available
to work because you live in an area without indus-
try, ‘no benefit to you, sorry.’ But you might be being
a positive influence. This policy disadvantages a lot
of not quite retirees who have a lot to contribute on
the marae.” 417 Moreover, “strong communities are
pivotal in prevention. For long term change we need
positive people.” 418
Of particular significance for domestic violence,
there are also problems with the 111 (emergency
services) phone service for individuals in rural areas.
“The call center is based in Auckland. Dispatchers
might not know locations or pronunciations of rural,
less known places. The dirt road distance might be 2
hours assuming the police are at the station to take
the call.” 419 As a result, women may not receive
assistance they require in a timely manner.
6. Relations between the Police and
Ma¯ori Communities
Issues regarding police enforcement of protection
orders and failure to serve protection orders have
been documented above.420 In addition to these gen-
eral problems, which apply to both Ma¯ori and non-
Ma¯ori communities, there is tension between the
police and Ma¯ori communities in parts of New
Zealand which may lead Ma¯ori not to call the police
in situations of domestic violence. As noted by sev-
eral interviewees, “Ma¯ori are suspicious of the police
—specifically in relation to domestic violence issues.
They ask themselves: Will they come? Will they
come in a timely manner? Will they inflict physical
harm?” 421 “People’s reluctance to involve the police in
domestic violence disputes reflects how people feel
about police in other parts of their lives.” 422 To illus-
trate this point, one person commented that Ma¯ori
are glad that the police do not carry guns.423 Anoth-
er interviewee explained
[r]ight now, a lot of effort is going into the
recruitment of Ma¯ori police officers. The
police department is trying to rebuild rapport
with the Ma¯ori community after last year’s
terrorism raids. . . . People see a disconnect
between the police saying it is wrong to
threaten violence in the home but then they
knocked down doors and subjected men and
elders to humiliation. How is it wrong to
threaten violence in the home but how is it
not wrong when a child sees his father kneel-
ing in the dust in his underwear? 424
The Leitner Center did meet with one service
provider that informed us that their community has
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no difficulty with police response to domestic vio-
lence.425 They attributed the solid police performance
in these cases to the personalities of the police in
that area and the relationships that had developed
between the police and the domestic violence serv-
ice providers there.426 Unfortunately, they acknowl-
edged that “the police response is totally dependent
on our relationships that we all have with them. . .
The bigger areas don’t have that.” 427
7. Ma¯ori programs addressing 
domestic violence
As noted above, New Zealand is obligated to take
measures to prevent and eliminate domestic vio-
lence.428 In many of our interviews in New Zealand,
people emphasized the importance of Ma¯ori pro-
grams to address domestic violence for Ma¯ori com-
munities because Ma¯ori will be more likely to access
such programs and because the substantive aspects
of such programs are more effective in reaching
Ma¯ori audiences.
In terms of accessing programs, Ma¯ori service
providers indicated that Ma¯ori were more likely to
attend programs run by Ma¯ori because they feel safe
culturally and do not encounter institutionalized
racism in such programs. “Ma¯ori clients work better
with Ma¯ori service providers. In order to promote
change within Ma¯ori communities, the change must
come from Ma¯ori. Before the Ma¯ori safe house,
Ma¯ori women just were not accessing services at
all.” 429 According to one Ma¯ori provider, their organ-
ization has determined “that in order to promote
change and education you need Ma¯ori to be
involved. A huge amount of Ma¯ori were not access-
ing services because there were no Ma¯ori faces.
Ma¯ori felt [the general domestic violence services
were not] for them.” 430 One provider explained that
they embrace the notion of cultural as well as phys-
ical safety. They take into account “cultural safety at
every point during contact with our client.” 431
According to another Ma¯ori provider, “It’s really
about creating and ensuring a culturally safe space.
If they didn’t have a culturally safe space, they might
not be willing to leave a situation of domestic vio-
lence.” 432 Mariameno Kapa-Kingi, General Manager,
Wha¯nau Whanui, Ngati Hine Health Trust, similarly
noted, “we are more comfortable with each other
because of our culture. . .Ma¯ori are more amenable
to receiving corrections from other Ma¯ori.” 433
Providing cultural safety through cultural prac-
tices such as separating items pertaining to food and
those pertaining to the body, removing shoes before
entering a house and use of karakia (prayers) allows
the women to engage.434 Di Grennell gave another
example regarding Ma¯ori organizations using cultur-
ally significant language when discussing zero toler-
ance to violence policies. She noted that “zero toler-
ance frameworks need to be culturally appropriate.
Amokura uses ‘Transforming Wha¯nau Violence.’ This
framework focuses on key cultural imperatives to
effect personal and cultural change.” 435
Having Ma¯ori service providers also frees vic-
tims from battling with institutional racism.436 Stacey
Pepene, Coordinator of Te Puna o te Aroha, Ma¯ori
Women’s Refuge in Whangarei recognizes institu-
tionalized racism as a form of violence and wants to
make sure a woman is “not having to defend her
position as a victim of domestic violence as well as
a Ma¯ori.” 437 For example, “Ma¯ori workers are more
likely to understand poverty and act in a respectful
way that doesn’t cause shame.” 438 This avoids judg-
ment using Pakeha views.439 To illustrate this prob-
lem, Ms. Pepene explained that:
traditionally Ma¯ori families sleep together [in
one large room as in a communal Marae set-
ting] but now the system uses that as an indi-
cator of unsafe conditions (and as grounds for
removing the children from the house, for
example). The government emphasis on over-
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crowding and the health and safety issues
associated with overcrowding is good in terms
of health management but that tells every
Ma¯ori that if you’re sleeping more than 1 per-
son to a room then you’re putting your family
at risk of disease. The effect of this is that it
drives Ma¯ori families underground. From a
public health standpoint this is dangerous. It
also results in an underreporting of actual
need to avoid the judgment.” 440
The Leitner Center met with one woman who went
through a Ma¯ori program to address her issues
regarding domestic violence. In discussing the effica-
cy of the program, she recounted that “[i]nstead of
leaving Ma¯oriness outside, and being embarrassed
about it, it embraced Ma¯oriness in all parts. It is a
holistic approach to healing that teaches the person
to embrace her identity.” 441
The substantive approach of Ma¯ori domestic
violence programs differs from other programs as
well in that Ma¯ori programs focus on the impact of
colonization on Ma¯ori and many problems that
Ma¯ori now face, in part as a result of colonization,
including domestic violence. Non-Ma¯ori programs,
in contrast, tend to focus on domestic violence as a
problem of intimate partner relations. One Ma¯ori
leader stated that “[m]ost people are blown away by
how violence came into the family because of colo-
nization and how drugs and alcohol also came into
the society because of colonization. Almost any neg-
ative behavior you can think of has infiltrated our
families.” 442 Another noted “that’s the nature of colo-
nization. You internalize the negatives about who
you are and [are told] someone else saved you.” 443
The Ma¯ori leader went on to explain that “violence
towards family is not an historical trait in the Ma¯ori
culture. The early settlers were very clear that they
found the Ma¯ori too indulgent with their children
and didn’t discipline them accordingly.” 444 As a result, 
the process of decolonization is such an
important part of the process of dealing with
domestic violence. Colonization gives a con-
text to Ma¯ori families who suffer from vio-
lence what is happening to them. For families,
it’s as if a light comes on for them after having
been in a place of darkness when they learn
about how colonization has affected them on
an individual level.445
Not surprisingly, some Ma¯ori leaders believe that
many of the programs addressing domestic violence
on an individual level have not worked for Ma¯ori.
We were told that “the government continues to
send people to DV programs that are individual-
focused. This has worked for some but it hasn’t
worked for Ma¯ori, Pasifika. . . anyone who isn’t
Anglo-saxon. If we want to be successful in the way
in which we govern then we ought to be supporting
successful programs.” 446 A domestic violence coun-
selor at a Ma¯ori provider similarly discussed “a prob-
lem of false consciousness with Ma¯ori that can be
connected to domestic violence, in that both circum-
stances have a patriarchal view of the relationship
(man-woman, Ma¯ori-crown). Ma¯ori cannot be
themselves, because they are forced into the colo-
nizer’s framework. Healing from domestic violence
requires healing on two levels in order to recover
from the victimization.” 447 According to Di Grennell,
to address domestic violence, you need to challenge
the idea that violence within wha¯nau is acceptable
or culturally valid and remove opportunities for vio-
lence to take place, which can be liberating for his-
torically oppressed communities.448 A successful
approach to domestic violence includes empowering
people to demonstrate their capacities. She empha-
sizes that quality and effective services are also a
necessary part of prevention.449
Ma¯ori organizations also discussed the impor-
tance of a communal or extended family approach to
address domestic violence. Amokura advocates for a
“wha¯nau oranga” or “wha¯nau (wider family) wellbe-
ing” framework, which sees the solution to family
violence incorporating the involvement of the
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extended family and the extended family as possess-
ing interests related to family violence, such as
shared responsibility for protection of a woman or
child or interests in redress.450 For other Ma¯ori
providers, the first step for women is to identify their
wha¯nau network and marae. “If you’re Ma¯ori you
have a wha¯nau” yet “some of our women are so dis-
connected that it’s about getting her. . .outside of the
nuclear family because as a Ma¯ori, that’s only the
beginning. It’s only the smaller core to a much larger
picture.” 451 These providers work to have the women
re-access those connections believing that “if we can
get her reconnecting with herwha¯nau, it’s going to be
much safer for her and the children. It’s about
empowering her to use those connections and
encouraging her to not work in isolation because one
of the founding tactics of domestic violence is isola-
tion. The perpetratorwill try to isolate her to the point
where she feels she’s burnt her bridges. . . ” 452 A Ma¯ori
leader also emphasized the importance of family:
“Kinship ties have been eroded through urbanization
as Ma¯ori have been shifted away from the tribal set-
ting and lost their connection to who they are. They
lose their connection with their extended family and
become isolated. That contributes to drug and alco-
hol use, family violence, etc. When you’re part of a
collective it’s a lot more difficult to get involved in
that type of behavior.” 453
To be clear, Ma¯ori Programs do not allow perpe-
trators of domestic violence to avoid responsibility for
their violent acts. Colonization is used as a starting
point to help Ma¯ori understand and deconstruct the
dynamics of violence within the context of coloniz-
ing practices. “It is a means of contextualizing the
violence of our country’s development” 454 and help-
ing Ma¯ori understand how they got to this place but
not to avoid all personal responsibility. For example,
at one men’s program we met with, men’s groups are
run with Ma¯ori culture and history as a guideline.
Men are greeted with powhiri. The groups discuss
the Treaty of Waitangi and on the board is written
“Male by birth, man by choice.” 455 Men are told to
think about this challenge and work to understand a
family relationship. Sessions include equality, parent-
ing and child care. Often, men don’t acknowledge
committing violence in the present, but blame it on
the past—they externalize the blame, and often
blame colonization. In such instances, they are told,
“white men came and colonized, but they didn’t pick
up your hand and make you smash your missus.” 456
8. The New Zealand government’s
obligation to consult with Ma¯ori
As noted above, pursuant to the Treaty of Waitangi,
the Crown is obligated to consult Ma¯ori before
adopting any measure that could affect them.457
While in New Zealand, the Leitner Center met with
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The substantive approach of Ma¯ori domestic 
violence programs differs from other programs as
well in that Ma¯ori programs focus on the impact of
colonization on Ma¯ori and many problems that
Ma¯ori now face, in part as a result of colonization,
including domestic violence.
a number of Ma¯ori organizations and individuals
who expressed frustration with the manner in which
the government conducted such “consultation” with
respect to domestic violence programs. For example,
one Ma¯ori leader expressed the view that:
The Domestic Violence Task Force should
work to hear a Ma¯ori voice in order to respect
the partnership idea of the Treaty of Waitangi.
The Treaty of Waitangi relationship is with the
Ma¯ori tribes, but the tribes are not invited to
the task force meeting. Rather, the crown sets
up the task force and then invites a few token
Ma¯ori to attend. . . this is not a partnership. If
the crown has defined the relationship, there
is no space for Ma¯ori tikanga. To make the
partnership into a reality, there needs to be a
change in the fundamental beliefs of the gov-
ernment. But the government does not want
to hear what Ma¯ori really have to say because
it is frightened about what it will have to
change.458
Another practitioner similarly noted that the “Ma¯ori
world view is ignored and isn’t taken to account until
later. The legislation is drafted, then passed, then
implemented and it is at that stage (implementation)
when we get to have some influence but by then it’s
too late.” 459 What should happen, according to a pres-
entation at a Ministry of Social Development meet-
ing, is that the “consultation process should mean
that the government approaches Ma¯ori with a few
options and engages with the Ma¯ori in making the
right choice. . . Ma¯ori want to have greater influence
on the creation of the options the government is
considering when creating new programs.” 460 To
address this gap, several providers advised that “the
most important thing would be for the [Domestic
Violence] legislation to mention the Treaty of Wait-
angi.” 461 All the regulations would then flow from
that. This would acknowledge that this policy has
specific relevance to Ma¯ori.” 462 A Ma¯ori leader simi-
larly noted that amending the DVA 1995 to reference
the Treaty of Waitangi would “force the government
to work with the people of the land. This [Labour]
government has been trying to move away from put-
ting the Treaty into Legislation.” 463 Another Ma¯ori
provider similarly noted that reference to the Treaty
would have implications for how regulations, policies
and practices are formulated and funded.464
Conclusions and Recommendations
FUNDING
Conclusion:
The New Zealand government currently relies
on NGOs to provide many of the services necessary
to comply with its obligations under international law
including, for example, providing shelters for victims
of domestic violence, education and outreach regard-
ing domestic violence, stopping violence programs,
telephone hotlines and training programs. The New
Zealand government does not provide sufficient
funding to cover the costs of such services, however. 
Recommendation:
When implementing the new Pathway to Part-
nership plan, the government should recognize the
actual demand for domestic violence services that it
relies on NGOs to provide (and that the govern-
ment is required to provide under international law),
such as providing shelters for victims of domestic
violence, education and outreach regarding domes-
tic violence, stopping violence programs, telephone
hotlines and training programs, and should allocate
adequate funding to cover the actual costs of such
services. 
Conclusion:
The New Zealand government appears to have
a short-term approach to funding domestic violence
service providers and programs whereby it will fund
an initiative at the outset but will not provide suffi-
cient funding to sustain programs, even those that
are successful. 
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Recommendation:
In order to more effectively address issues relat-
ed to domestic violence and to comply with its inter-
national obligations, the New Zealand government
should consider providing funding to sustain suc-
cessful domestic violence service providers and pro-
grams rather than prioritizing new initiatives and
studies.
Conclusion:
Typically, contracts between the New Zealand
government and service providers working on
domestic violence issues do not allow government
funding to be used for buildings, telephone lines or
other capital expenditures. Yet such expenses are
often necessary for an organization to effectively
provide the relevant services. 
Recommendation:
The New Zealand government should provide
funding for capital expenditures where such items
are necessary for NGOs to provide the domestic vio-
lence services the government outsources to them.
APPROVAL AND CONTRACTING FOR 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SERVICE PROVIDERS
Conclusion:
Under the DVA 1995 and its implementing reg-
ulations, domestic violence service providers must
be approved by the government and receive a gov-
ernment contract in order to receive government
funding. The system for approving domestic violence
providers and programs is both complicated and
lengthy. The approval process requires applicants to
submit detailed written submissions to panels that
review the applications. The government process for
approval has the effect of limiting approval and con-
tracts (and, as a result, limiting funding) for Ma¯ori
service providers who often lack the technical
expertise to navigate the application process. As a
result, in some areas, there are no organizations
funded to provide needed domestic violence services.
Recommendation:
The government should consider simplifying the
application process to obtain approval for domestic
violence service providers and programs, providing
template forms and making panel members or gov-
ernment officials available to assist Ma¯ori service
providers and organizations with the application
process.
Conclusion:
In some instances, government contracts for
domestic violence services are only available
through an electronic tendering system. Organiza-
tions that lack access to technology and the internet
are not able to access the applications for such con-
tracts. 
Recommendation:
The government should ensure that applications
for government contracts are made available to
Ma¯ori service providers and organizations that lack
access to the on-line forms for government contracts
for domestic violence services.
Conclusion:
The administrative requirements in terms of
paperwork and supervision after an organization
receives approval can also be onerous, and in some
cases impossible, for Ma¯ori service providers to sat-
isfy, especially for service providers in rural and
more remote locations. 
Recommendation:
The government should consider revising the
administrative requirements in terms of paperwork
and supervision for organizations that have provider
and program approval in order to reflect what is pos-
sible for Ma¯ori and rural service providers and
thereby to encourage the provision of services in
areas of need while maintaining standards for gov-
ernment-funded services. 
SERVICES IN RURAL AREAS
Conclusion:
Rural Ma¯ori communities have particular diffi-
culties in accessing services. In some areas there are
limited providers because no one in the area can
qualify for approval or comply with the administra-
tive requirements to sustain funding. The difficulty of
reaching rural populations is compounded by the
geography and lack of infrastructure in the North. Of
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particular significance for domestic violence victims,
there are problems with the 111 (emergency servic-
es) phone service for individuals in rural areas. Dis-
patchers at the call centers are sometimes unfamil-
iar with locations or pronunciations of rural, less
known places. As a result, police are not always able
to respond to calls for help in a timely manner. 
Recommendation:
The government should consider providing
regional or more local call centers for 111 phone serv-
ices so that emergency services can respond to indi-
viduals in rural areas on a timely and effective basis. 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND
MA¯ORI COMMUNITIES
Conclusion:
There is general distrust between Ma¯ori com-
munities and the police in parts of New Zealand, par-
ticularly after the terrorist raids in 2007, which may
lead Ma¯ori not to call the police in situations of
domestic violence. 
Recommendation:
The police department should try to repair rela-
tions and develop strong relationships with the
Ma¯ori community so that Ma¯ori will contact the
police in situations of domestic violence. The effort in
some parts of New Zealand to recruit Ma¯ori police
officers is clearly a positive step. There are existing
models of close cooperation between domestic vio-
lence service providers and the police in some com-
munities in New Zealand that could be replicated
elsewhere in the country.
MA¯ORI PROGRAMS ADDRESSING 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Conclusion:
The New Zealand government should be com-
mended for funding Ma¯ori service providers to pro-
vide Kaupapa Ma¯ori programs on domestic violence
and Ma¯ori shelters. Ma¯ori are more likely to access
such programs and the substantive approach of such
programs appears to be more effective in reaching
Ma¯ori individuals. 
Recommendation:
New Zealand should continue to support Ma¯ori
service providers to provide Kaupapa Ma¯ori pro-
grams on domestic violence and Ma¯ori shelters and
should allocate adequate funding to cover the actual
costs of such services under the new Pathway to
Partnership plan.
THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT’S 
OBLIGATION TO CONSULT WITH MA¯ORI
Conclusion:
Under the Treaty of Waitangi and international
law, the New Zealand government has an obligation
to consult with Ma¯ori before adopting strategies, ini-
tiatives or programs that will impact Ma¯ori, including
domestic violence strategies, initiatives or programs.
Recommendation:
In order to comply with its obligations under the
Treaty of Waitangi and international law, the govern-
ment should consult with Ma¯ori regarding new
strategies, initiatives or programs to address domes-
tic violence in Ma¯ori communities at an early stage
when Ma¯ori can help shape the new programs
(rather than asking Ma¯ori to approve strategies, ini-
tiatives or programs that have already been formu-
lated by the government). The government should
also consider amending the DVA 1995 to reference
the Treaty of Waitangi. We recognize this is a contro-
versial proposal but, in so referencing the Treaty, the
government would signal to Ma¯ori that it is serious
about its commitment to consult Ma¯ori about
domestic violence strategies, initiatives or programs
which impact them and to its Treaty obligations
more broadly.
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Conclusion
Notwithstanding New Zealand’s commitments under international and domestic
law to secure equality for women and to prevent, investigate and punish acts of
domestic violence, violence against women continues to be an acute social problem
in New Zealand.  While it is clear that New Zealand
has made deliberate efforts to combat domestic vio-
lence, this report identifies a number of weaknesses
with New Zealand’s domestic law and policies to
address domestic violence and offers suggestions for
how such problems might be addressed.  It is our
hope that this report contributes to the work of the
many non-governmental organizations, government
officials, service providers, lawyers and academics
working on these challenging issues in New Zealand.
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